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ABSTRACT

The violent history shared between Catholic and Protestant ethnic/religious
groups in Northern Ireland has deteriorated the trust between both communities and
public institutions. This conflict is most acute in Belfast, Northern Ireland's urban center,
where 'peace lines' have been constructed to divide the two conflicting ethnic/religious
groups. Planning agencies have struggled having to plan around the confines of conflict.
These measures have resulted in managing conflict, and as a result it has been difficult
for these agencies to resolve long term planning problems. In addition, planning agencies
have relied on technical analysis and in doing so have inadvertently ignored deeper social
issues. This is exhibited in plans and polices thus far that have concentrated on technical
analysis in decision making. The organizational problem is that Northern Ireland is
notably different from the rest of the U.K., and therefore traditional planning practice is
not enough to ensure successful urban development. By incorporating conflict resolution
strategies into the planning process many of the problems can be successfully
accomplished.
The strategies for conflict resolution that are incorporated into the planning
process are defined as consensus building, facilitation, negotiation, mediation, arbitration,
and evaluation. Building trust is central throughout the entire planning process. If
planners were to incorporate these strategies they would be more successful in achieving
goals and objectives. It is designed to start locally and grow nationally, and as it does the
issue between national territorial ownership increasingly becomes inconsequential
because the residents associate themselves more within a co-existent community.

Vll

Ideally, Northern Ireland becomes one independent and collective nation based on
internal resolution.
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Chapter One: Thesis Overview
Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to gain a better perspective of the role urban planning
has in a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution. It will not presume to
prescribe a solution to conflict in totality, but rather how urban planning agencies have a
vested interest and how they can influence the process of resolution rather then managing
conflict as a coping mechanism. The focus area of this study is Belfast, Northern Ireland,
which currently integrates conflict management into urban planning policies. This
integration is the result of a violent history of conflict shared between Catholic and
Protestant ethnic groups. Conflict management, as defined by Susan Stewart (1998),
suggests that a problem is removed from a situation for a certain period of time, but still
has an underling potential for conflict to erupt. Conflict resolution, on the other hand,
eliminates the dispute in its entirety (Stewart, 1998). Many complications that urban
planners face in Northern Ireland, as well as in many other countries, are directly linked
to strategies that attempt to manage conflict. As a result, it is difficult to resolve
underling issues critical to a successful planning process. This thesis will identify these
strategies and describe how it has prolonged the division between Catholics and
Protestants, as well as how a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution can go
further in eliminating historical ethnic polarization.
In considering a shift in conflict management to conflict resolution four factors
must be addressed to fully understand the complexity of this paradigm. These include the
history of ethnic division, demographics, interagency structure, and planning policy.
1

These factors are individually powerful, and together they have been successful in
creating a segregated community structure. This success is both blessed and cursed
because the result of segregation protects the public but also reinforces hostility. These
factors have influenced community structure and are counter-productive to resolving
internal conflicts that arise periodically. In order for a paradigm shift to occur, elements
that influence community structure have to be identified.
Belfast Northern Ireland has remained predominately segregated since the onset
of English political control in the 1ih century (Seaton, 1998). Today, communities
within the city remain, in most part, entirely segregated based upon religious ethnic
identity. These homogenous communities are both segregated out of will and
enforcement as the result of conflict between Protestant and Catholic groups. Combined
these groups contribute almost exclusively to the total population and are evenly divided
in number (NISRA, 2003). Since 1969, Northern Ireland has been most noted for it's
sectarian violence and wide spread political unrest (Donnan, 1997). This recent history is
commonly referred to as "the troubles" (Neill, 1993). It was at this critical point that
Catholics began to protest against civil rights and the unequal policies that segregated
their community. (See Appendix I)
To understand the implications of segregated community structure, it is first
important to understand the political structure of_Northern Ireland as well as its relation to
England. This structure is responsible for how policies are administered and have helped
to reaffirm segregation. Today, many planning decisions are made indirectly through the
British government. The Department of Environment, Belfast Development Office
(BDO), is responsible for overseeing all planning projects within the city (Neill, 1993).
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In face of this centralized power, the elected Belfast city council only has the right of
being consulted on planning matters. As a result, many planning strategies are closely
intertwined with conflict management policies between multiple agencies as a means to
control sectarian violence.
The most predominant and challenging planning strategy is the creation of
physical barriers, known more commonly as 'peace lines' (Murtagh, 1995). Peace lines
divide communities in an attempt to minimize sectarian violence between Catholic and
Protestant ethnic groups. There are currently thirteen 'peace lines' in Belfast. These
structures are nearly 20ft high and made of steel, barbed wire, and concrete (Murtagh,
1995). In addition, the barriers create a sense of boundary or edge between the two
communities, which reinforce territorial convictions. Multiple agencies with vested
interests were responsible for the creation of 'peace lines', but as indicated in a 1987
Housing Executive report 'Coping with Conflict' those same agencies are not responsible
for improving the conditions in and around these areas.
This thesis will describe how planning has shaped the urban spatial structure, the
problems created by conflict and managing for it, as well as how a shift from managing
conflict to resolution could resolve other fundamental planning problems in Belfast. Thus
far, policies have failed to solve deeply rooted ethnic division within shared segregated
geographical areas. 'Wedge planning' describes the means of which planning has taken
place in these communities as a means to cope with conflict. Much of the information is
based on literature obtained in relation to Belfast Northern Ireland, however it is intended
to provide examples and possible solutions to common problems found in other
communities that experience conflict as a result of ethnic division. This research will
3

provide alternative principles for urban planning to help foster a more proactive
movement beyond managing conflict to a more fruitful process of resolution.
Comments on the Literature

A large amount of literature has been published on both conflict management and
conflict resolution. To narrow the focus, this thesis concentrates on literature that relates
to case studies of conflict management and the process or implications it has had on
Northern Ireland, and other countries that encounter similar problems. Additionally, it
examines the limited number of studies that illustrate conflict resolution and the peace
process in that country. Northern Ireland is not an island into itself in terms of conflict.
Other countries have struggled with the similar conflicting issues (Gidron, 2002).
Therefore, an examination of examples similar to that of Northern Ireland should also be
included. Those countries that are most similar include Israel and apartheid South Africa.
The process that these countries have followed can provide alternative means for
achieving resolution over management.
Some literary sources use the words management and resolution interchangeably
(Stewart, 1998). This presents a challenge to the research, in which techniques being
utilized must be identified as management or resolution strategies. If the strategies are
misrepresented, the research itself is in jeopardy of being misleading and fails to
successfully create a shift from conflict management to conflict resolution. Many of the
strategies that have been utilized are in effect the initial steps to resolution, but have not
taken extra measures to move forward in the process, and therefore are still considered
tools for managing conflict.
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There is a wealth of information on Belfast and Northern Ireland in terms of it's
history, conflict, and urban planning. Of all the literature in review, this information is
the most abundantly available. This information provides a solid foundation for
reviewing the number of conflict management techniques that have been utilized. The
most profound and essential information is the evenly divided ethnic social structure,
which has been revealed in both 1991 and 2001 census information. This information
together with urban planning initiatives will help to identify conflict management
strategies that are at the core of policy making; thus enabling the ability to present
alternative planning measures that facilitate a shift from conflict management to a more
finalized resolution.
Research Question

How can urban planning policy move from focusing on conflict management to conflict
resolution?
Methodology

To answer the research question, the following steps will be taken to achieve a
thorough examination of the elements that are most indicative of the current state of
conflict in Belfast Northern Ireland.
1. Describe the socio-economic dynamics of the ethnically divided population.
2. Summarize the cause and key events that have resulted in ethnic conflict.
3. Describe the role of planning in creating physical barriers to separate the
conflicted populations.
4. Describe the theories of conflict management and conflict resolution, and identify
their similarities and differences.
5

5. Identify planning principles that support conflict resolution theory.
6. Apply those principles to planning strategies that can be used to facilitate a
paradigm shift in approaching conflict issues. Examples:
•

Cross-cultural mediation and communication to define commonalities in
societal goals

•

Identify forums for communication among those with common concern.

•

Identify non-traditional leaders to facilitate dialog in and between
communities.

• Identify symbolic projects and programs that support the improvement of
common concerns.
•

Select a symbolic elimination of a physical barrier that is relatively low
risk to both communities.

•

Create collaborative voice to facilitate the marginalization of extremists.

Overview of Chapter Contents

This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one is the introduction consisting
of a brief overview of the current situation of conflict in Northern Ireland, a literature
review of relevant literary materials, the research question and the methods for research.
Chapter Two outlines the socio-economic dynamics representative of Belfast, as well as
the social perceptions between the two ethnic communities. Chapter Three illustrates the
key events of ethnic conflict that have shaped the· physical and social character of
Northern Ireland and more specifically the Belfast urban area. Chapter Four identifies
the stakeholders within the urban planning network, how these agencies have and do
conduct planning within the city, and how conflict management has been at the core of
6

their polices and initiatives. This chapter also identifies the interface communities that
are directly affected by planning strategies, as well as obstacles now faced by agencies
due these implemented strategies. Chapter Five provides a thorough examination of
conflict management and conflict resolution, the similarities and differences to both and
barriers to implementing resolution strategies. The chapter concludes by identifying
additional tools that can be utilized to complement conflict resolution. Chapter Six
brings the elements of socio-economic dynamics of the population, planning agencies,
and resolution techniques together to create alternative strategies to bring about the
peaceful resolution of conflict between both the Catholic and Protestant communities in
the context of urban planning initiatives. Chapter Seven is the summation of the thesis,
the possible limitations and constraints and further research that can be conducted to
promote the peaceful resolution between communities in Northern Ireland as well as
other communities faced with similar conflict.

7

Chapter Two: Socio-Economic Dynamics of the Population
Socio-Economic Dynamics
Social Characteristics

Northern Ireland is geographically the size of Connecticut (Seaton, 1998), and has
a population of 1.6 million (NISRA, 2001). According to the Northern Ireland Statistics
and Research Association (2001), the population is 39% Protestant and 38% Catholic in
ethnic origin. The other 23 % make up a culmination of other ethnicities. These numbers
have changed only slightly in the last thirty years. The change is attributed to an increase
in population in the Catholic community. For centuries, Protestants have contributed to a
somewhat larger segment of the population, however the Catholic community's figures
are only slightly smaller and continue to show growth at an accelerated rate (Seaton,
1998). The distribution of population between the two groups contributes in part to the
Protestant's historic hold of power and discrimination over the Catholic community.
Until thirty years ago, the Catholic community had little to no organization in voicing
their concerns over issues related to civil rights. As Catholic population numbers grew
and conditions deteriorated in their communities, they began to arm themselves and
attack in both peaceful and violent ways.
Belfast has a population of almost 280,000 people and a density of 24 persons per
hectare (NISRA, 2001 ). Table 2.1 illustrates that interface communities within the urban
area experience relatively higher densities, which can be attributed to an urban setting.
However, as illustrated, Catholic communities are of the highest density.
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Table 2. 1 : Resident Population, Ethnic Composition & Density (NISRA 2001)
All
Ethnic
Eth nic
Association Composition Commun ity Persons
Belfast
N/A
277391
Ardoyne
Catholic
6591
'>80%}
Protestant
Balleymacarrett
4939
'>60%}
Clonard
Catholic
441 9
'>90%}
Protestant
Duncairn
3997
'>90%}
Falls
Catholic
�>90%)
5043
Island
Protestant
4275
'>90%)
Catholic
New Lodge
52 14
'>80%)
Protestant
Shaftesbury
5745
'>70%)
Protestant
Shankill
'>90%)
3790
Protestant
Woodvale
'>90%)
4609

Males

1 29778
3032
2258
2084
1 859
2268
1 988
2431
2750
1 744
2086

Area
Population
Females (hectares) Density

1 4761 3
3559
2681
2335
21 38
2775
2287
2783
2995
2046
2523

1 1 488
58
78
61
924
1 20
38 1
72
223
93
57

This is one indication that Catholic communities are experiencing overcrowding as a
result of an increase in population growth. Protestant communities that show higher
figures of density also have lower levels of religious composition. For example,
Balleymacarrett has a population density of 63 persons per hectare, and a religious
composition greater than 60 percent. This may indicate in-migration of the Catholic
population. These are basic assumptions and further analysis would be needed to
determine its validity. One observation is certain, the number of women in each
community is slightly larger than its male counter-part. Several studies have indicated
that women are more likely to accept people of other religious origin and favor attempts
of cross-community interaction (Gidron et. al., 2002; Seaton, 1 998; Murtagh 2002). This
willful interaction is an important indicator and factor in moving towards a peaceful
resolution.
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24
113
63
72
4
42
11
73
26
41
81

Housing

Catholic families tend to be larger in number than Protestant families, and as a
result have a higher rate of population growth in Northern Ireland (Murtagh, 1995). This
contributes to overcrowding in homes with two or more family members sharing
bedrooms. Overcrowding is not limited to individual homes, but to entire communities
as well. While Catholic communities are overcrowded and in desperate need for space,
Protestant communities are blighted with vacant dwellings on nearly every street.
According to the 1991 census, Catholic communities are on average 12% more
overcrowded than Protestant and integrated neighborhoods (NISRA 1991). This is
illustrated in the map of religious distribution in Belfast (page xvii) where clearly
Catholic population represents significantly less territory.
Throughout the United Kingdom there is a general concern about the growing
gap between the cost of housing and household incomes (NIHE, 2001). In Northern
Ireland, first time buyers are having a difficult time buying property in the location of
their choice. The average cost of a home in Belfast is nearly one hundred thousand
dollars (NIHE 2001). The alternative to this is the social housing program. Based on
figures presented by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive, the waiting list for public
housing is greatest in areas in close proximity to interface areas and the number of
available dwelling units in the social housing sector is much greater in these locations
(NIHE, 2001). This limits people to particular locations of residence most commonly in
interface areas. In December 2000, the total waiting list for homes was 32,056; almost
half of the applications were for housing transfers (NIHE, 2001). Problems in
infrastructure, physical space, and availability are all common problems that planning
11

agencies are struggling to solve. Peace lines dividing residential areas further hinder
possible solutions that could be achieved.
Children and the Educational System

The long-term antipathy between the two communities has created an ethos, in
which the opposing ethnic group is "demonized" (Seaton, 1 998). Children learn these
values from their families and community environments. As a result, violence has
become a common part of the socialization experience for children. As one resident
explained, the rioting season is at its peak during the summer months after children leave
school for holiday (Denvir, 2002). Currently, the judicial system lacks law for
punishment against children who participate in unlawful acts of violence and vandalism.
During riot outbreaks, adults (many just old enough to be prosecuted by law) stand along
the fringe encouraging children to engage in unlawful acts. This is the result of current
policies within the judicial system, which cannot punish children under the same laws
that pertain to adults.
A very small percentage of students are enrolled in integrated schools. In these
schools administrators attempt to create a curriculum, which teaches students an
understanding of both traditions. The majority of children are in either state schools that
promote a British Unionist tradition; or in Catholic schools, which promote Irish
Nationalist tradition. Despite attempts at cross-cultural programs between schools,
children tend to be isolated from each other and from opposing traditions (Murray, 1 995).
Catholic children tend to have higher dropout rates than do Protestant children, which
contributes to higher unemployment rate (Seaton, 1 998).
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Institutions

Social institutions are considered to be structural reinforcers of the internal
conflict within Northern Ireland. The community's fundamental interests are
incompatible in their present structure; for the Protestants it is security and for Catholics
it is equality (Raune et. al., 1991). Measures have been taken to restructure institutions
in an attempt to address these concerns. For example, the Police Service of Northern
Ireland (PSNI), have until recently included an overwhelming majority of officers who
are predominately Protestant. Part of the Good Friday Agreement, was to restructure the
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and tum it into the PSNI. The RUC has been criticized
for it's ethnic/religious profiling and was authorized to restructure its force to include
more members of the Catholic community. The two main objectives within this
restructuring were to hire a balance of officers from both ethnic groups and abolish a
procedure to swear allegiance to the Queen.
The demands of coping with terrorist organizations of both groups have
compromised human rights (Seaton, 1998). Due to the lack of confidence in the police
system in Catholic inner city neighborhoods, many residents in these communities rely
on the IRA to operate a quasi-police force. Incidences of punishment, beatings,
shootings, and threats of exile to Ireland have become common. As a result, this has
reinforced both the power and prestige of paramilitary organizations within Catholic
communities, and further eroded the sense of security for the Protestant population. For
crime statistics.
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Economic Characteristics

The significant increase in violence has had a strong effect on the economy.
Business is generated by conflict due to high incidences of property damage caused by
vandalism. The number of construction related businesses are particularly significant.
For example, glass manufacturing is a very lucrative industry due to the high level of
vandalism throughout the city, which targets both residential and commercial areas.
There is also a large market for private security firms to provide surveillance personnel in
commercial businesses and construction sites, as well as personal systems within
residential homes. The British government pays for the cost of damages to property and
injuries suffered by people in connection with terrorist attacks, an estimated 40 million
dollars annually (Seaton, 1998). Within the middle class community, there is little reason
financially to discourage vandalism because many of their wages are derived either
indirectly or directly from such activities. The professional or white-collar
neighborhoods benefit from inexpensive housing and excellent schools for their children.
In addition, all families in all communities ·benefit from annual subsidies of several
billion dollars in maintenance of public services (Seaton, 1 998).
Unemployment

The unemployment rate in Northern Ireland was 11 % in 2002, and about 21 % of
households received income support (NISRA, 2003). These figures are much higher in
inner city neighborhoods of Belfast as the unemployment rate is 31 % and 41% of
households receive income support (NISRA, 2003). Job losses have been most profound
in shipbuilding, heavy engineering and textile·sectors, which formed the basis of
Protestant working class employment. Employment growth has been greatest in the
14

public and service sectors, areas that have traditionally benefited Catholic job chances
(Murtagh, 2002). These structural changes have had uneven effects on the spatial
economy and especially in the working class Protestant areas that have struggled to cope
with de-industrialization. When associated with socio-demographic changes, the decline
of inner city communities was bound to be disproportionate between Catholic and
Protestant neighborhoods.
In the 1980' s 'reimaging' in the city was the central focus for stimulating the
economy. Urban regeneration targeted the expansion of the retail sector and office
development. The main beneficiaries were the prosperous middle-class whose income
was strengthened with high public spending (Neill, 1995). The project met criticizism for
the lack oflong-tenn sustainability that it was projected to create. By 1994 retail growth
had reached its plateau as rental space remained static (Neill, 1995). It was also unable to
bring about a change in the larger unemployment situation. Many employees in the
service industry live from paycheck to paycheck, as well as a significant number of
temporary administrative opportunities, which do not support a sustainable means of
mcome.
A project aimed at job creation in the urban area was "Making Belfast Work"
program. Initiated in 1988, the program aimed to "stimulate greater economic activity,
reinforce local enterprise, improve the quality of the environment and equip the people of
these areas to compete successfully for available employment" (Murtagh, 1995). It
accomplished this by providing more funding for schools, local health care facilities, job
clubs, and adult education programs. In an evaluation of the program in 1993 no
significant improvements to unemployment had been made placing the blame on the low
15

level of finance and the complexity of the deprivation problem (Murtagh, 1995). Other
programs that have been established to improve the unemployment situation include the
New Action Community Employment program and the Belfast Action Teams of which
success or failure has not yet been determined.
Intercommunity & Cross Community Perceptions & Attitudes

There are two separate attitudes shared by both ethnic communities, attitudes
towards those that share their own identity and those of the other ethnic group. According
to data collected in both communities, a constant theme across all study areas is that
Protestant communities judge Catholics less acceptable than Catholics do Protestants
(Murtagh, 1995), although a majority of residents on both sides said that they would
consider allowing members from another ethnic group to join clubs and societies and
visit into one's neighborhood (Murtagh, 1995). As Catholic housing pressure continues
to grow and as vacancy rates increase in Protestant neighborhoods, any in-migration
would be perceived as the beginning of the end for the existing resident community. Due
to the genuine fears over the future of territory and community stability, it is necessary
that communities feel confident about their own identity and future stability before any
cross community initiatives would be successful. Movement patterns and feelings of fear
and threat depend on the level of tension or violence within close proximity to the
community. The tension and violence increase at different times of the year. In
particular, there is a feeling that traditional anniversaries, marches, and parades are
contributory to the increased tension and hostile outbreaks. The implications are that this
is where local community relation efforts should be targeted.
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Peace building, conflict resolution, and cross community organizations have all
been established to work within each or both the Catholic and Protestant communities in
an attempt to bring about a peaceful coexistence. These organizations are varied,
complex, and multifaceted with their own agendas. However, the general attempt of
these organizations is to develop agendas that build on positive and productive links
between the two communities. A recent study by the Northern Ireland Council for
Voluntary Action (NICVA) estimated that there were over 5,000 active voluntary
organizations absorbing 400 million dollars annually (Gidron, 2002). Many of the
organizations that have been established are a direct result of the conflict associated
between the two communities. Members of these organizations range from middle class
individuals, whose motives are general altruism and philanthropy, to individuals with
more immediate reasons for activism, such as living in areas affected by political
violence (Gidron, 2002). Presumably, there is some degree of danger in the involvement
with such organizations, however in reflection of the number that have been established
the danger must be considered minimal.
Community Life at Interface Areas

Boal (1969) suggests that there is an inverse relationship between the degree of
assimilation between two ethnic groups and the degree of residential segregation that
exist between them. Increasing assimilation will be accompanied by decreasing
segregation and the physical separation of residence may contribute to and reinforce
division (Boal, 1969). The positive side of segregation is that concentration allows a
group to maintain its social cohesion. It maintains cultural values, it strengthens social
networks, and it allows the passing of critical thresholds for the support of institutions
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(Murtagh, 2002). Interface areas represent the locations where segregated communities
exist next to one another. In Belfast, sectarian violence and vandalism commonly occur
in these locations.
Identified by Brendan Murtagh ( 1 995), there are four categories of people who
live in interface areas. These include liberals, leaders, young toughs, and the apathetic.
The liberals are considered to be the largest group in residence, and tend to have a
positive attitude towards members of the opposing community. There are the leaders,
representing a small number of the population, who posses a certain degree of control
over the local community. Then there are the young toughs, generally male, who are
identified as a key element responsible for violent and destructive behaviors. Generally,
young toughs are unemployed, experience high benefit dependency, and achieve
relatively low levels of educational attainment (Murtagh, 1 995). As one Catholic resident
stated, their benefit dependency is in retaliation against British occupation. "If the British
government will not give up Northern Ireland territory than they will bleed British
governments pockets dry" (Denvir, 2002). In addition, they generally have little
investment in their own community. Many of these young toughs are under legal age of
prosecution so their actions go unpunished. The final group of residents is the apathetic,
which are small in proportion and have little allegiance to a majority religion, political
party or ethnic code. The most rational start in building cross-community relationships is
to facilitate dialogue between individuals who Murtagh ( 1 995) characterizes as the
liberals, as well as those in leadership roles. This has already been accomplished in many
of the communities and the results have been overwhelmingly successful.
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Three factors identified in a recent study, if acknowledged by planners and policy
makers, could reinforce cross-community initiatives and policies for the future. First, a
majority of residents living in interface areas have a positive attitude towards the
opposing community and to the idea of community relations as part of local development.
Second, such an initiative can be severely restricted by extremists in the community who
can often determine the rules governing local community life and the scope of
independent action. Third, for planning policy to have any success planners must
recognize the rules governing them, the way they are imposed, and their effect on local
initiatives (Murtagh, 1 995). Including residents in the planning process, of which
initiatives are targeted at their communities, would have a positive effect.
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Chapter Three: Key Events and Causes That Have Resulted In
Ethnic Conflict
History of Territorial Conflict
Historical events have shaped the dynamics of how individuals live in Northern
Ireland. The native Gaelic inhabitants and those who reside there now have struggled for
independence since the 16th century. Table 3.1 provides a chronological account of the
historical events that have shaped the physical and social character of Northern Ireland
(See also Appendix I). The British monarchs intention was to colonize the North with
Scottish and English settlers to give Britain a stronger control over its rebellious territory
(McShefferey, 2000). The significance of this action, and similar discriminatory
behaviors is the root of the country's current instability. Though an overwhelming
majority of the population have been born and raised in Northern Ireland, as were their
parents and generations before them, harsh sentiments still run deep.
Conflict between the two ethnic groups has been the focus of attention both
nationally and internationally. The attention gained can be attributed to a series of
violent attacks between various paramilitary organizations. In light of media attention,
the Irish Republican Anny (IRA) is thought to be the primary terrorist organization
associated with sectarian violence. More accurately, including the IRA, there are six
primary paramilitary organizations in existence and most likely smaller more isolated
cells. Those that identify themselves as fighters against British control include the IRA,
or more accurately the Provisional IRA, and the Irish National Liberation Anny (INLA);
and in tum those that are Loyalist include the Ulster Defense Association (UDA)
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Year

Table 3.1: Chronology of Events in Ireland From 1600-2002
Event

Early 1600's

Formal "Plantation" of Scottish and English settlers in Ireland.

Late 1600's

1800

Repressive "Penal Laws" established to restrict Catholics education,
property ownership, religious practice and political participation.
"Battle of the Boyne" the defeat of Catholic James by Protestant
William of Orange.
"The Act of Union" formally making Ireland part of the UK.

1800's

"Home Rule Movement" interest in gaining for local political power.

Early 1900's

Protestants (in attempt to preserve union with Great Britain) reject
Home Rule.
"Easter Rising" proclamation of the Irish Republic; rebellion was
defeated.
Sinn Fein representatives elected in Ireland; refused to attend session in
London; formed its own parliament in Dublin. Irish volunteers later
known as the IRA attack police and army; beginning of the Anglo-Irish
War.
"The Government of Ireland Act"; the partition of Ireland 26 counties in
the south and 6 in the North each to have their own parliament and
limited-self government. Republican movement rejected the act.
Anglo-Irish War ends. The Anglo-Irish Treaty creating the Irish Free
State. Self-governing but still apart of the UK.
The Irish Free State becomes the Republic of Ireland and leaves the
British Commonwealth.
Civil rights campaign begins, Catholic want reforms for their
community. Violence becomes common.
"Bloody Sunday" unarmed civilians killed by British Army, violence
escalates. N.I. Parliament "Stormont" suspended from direct-rule.
High level of paramilitary violence.

1690

1916
1919

1920
1921
1948
1968
1972
1970's - 1980's
1985
1986 - 1991
1993
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The Anglo-Irish Agreement; establishes consultation about N.I. by
Ireland and Britain in attempt to resolve conflict situation.
Heightened attacks by republican paramilitaries against British; loyalist
paramilitaries attack Sinn Fein politicjans and activists.
Downing Street Declaration- reaffirming attempt between Irish and
British governments to resolve situation.

Table 3 .1: (continued)
Year

Event

1994

IRA cease-fire is declared in august; loyalist cease-fire follows in October.

1996

IRA bomb attacks end cease-fire.

1997

1999

IRA renews ceasefire; creation of the Independent International
Commission on Decommissioning (IlCD).
Peace Agreement established to share power in political process; mainly
allowing Sinn Fein to engage in talks with British government.
Direct Rule Ends as powers dissolve in the Northern Ireland assembly.

2000

Direct Rule reinstated; New Inquiry into the events of "Bloody Sunday".

2002

IICD announces IRA has decommissioned; Direct Rule once again
suspended after suspicion of IRA operations.

1998

(Source: Seaton, 1998; CNN.com 2003)

operating as the Ul�ter Freedom Fighters (UFF), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
(Seaton 1998). Sectarian violence goes far beyond the reports of international media
coverage. Common occurrences of violence and vandalism occur in residential
communities on a frequent basis. Helicopters frequently patrol the skies to monitor
outbreaks that occur (author, 2002). Physical barriers, known as 'peace lines', have been
erected to separate and minimize the threat of these incidences. At first glance, this may
seem to serve as a solution, but it does not solve the deeper issues that result in conflict.
In addition, such barriers create complications in other planning related areas and as a
result under serve public needs.
Discrimination is found in employment, education, housing, public services, and
access to political power. In common inquiry, a person can determine an individual's
religious or ethnic background by learning their last name, address, and/or educational
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history. Though human rights laws have been established, bias still remains a
considerable problem and contributes to a large sector of the population seeking qualified
employment. Ultimately, this creates skewed unemployment rates, and unnecessarily
high levels of impoverished people with dependency on public housing and other
services.
Today, Northern Ireland is facing a pivotal point in its history as the Catholic
population continues to grow and begins to replace the Protestapts as the largest ethnic
group in the country. This has created an interesting paradox of shifting power that has
tension mounting in every facet of Northern Ireland, and which is also beginning to
circulate into British and Irish governments as well. The British government' s control in
Northern Ireland would have been limited without the help of a resident population in the
1 ih century, which supported its governmental control. The Protestant community
eagerly took on this responsibility. In response, for centuries the British government has
turned a blind eye towards ethnic injustices that occurred in Northern Ireland.· Today it is
less obvious that such large-scale injustices occur, and though improvements have been
made in the last twenty years, they still occur hidden behind politics and urban policies.
It is difficult for the Protestant community to share power and control after being
its sole proprietor for such a prolo11ged period. In recent years, Protestants have protested
for the removal of Catholic political parties, most notably Sinn Fein. Questionable tactics
have been used to create suspicions of Sinn Fein's knowledge and connection with
unlawful acts perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). As a result, in October
2002 British government regained full control over Northern Ireland after alleged IRA
activity. The Ulster Unionist political party refused to hold or attend sessions if Sinn
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Fein members were present (BBC News 2002). This most recent case demonstrates the
underlying fear of sharing power with a political party that supports the rights of a
population soon to be larger than its own.
Since the 1998 Peace Agreement) which allowed power sharing as part of a deal
for IRA ceasefire, the Ulster Unionist political party, has been searching for ways to
regain control. In a sense this has been accomplished. In the fall of 2002, British
Parliament reinstated its control over Northern Ireland after allegations from the Ulster
Unionist political party accused Sinn Fein of having prior knowledge over an IRA arms
dealing in South America and had leaked confidential d�cuments to the paramilitary
organization (BBC News, 2002).

These accusations have never been proven.

Coincidently, the same political party that made accusations are still represented in the
British Parliament. It proves that even at the highest levels of authority where policy
making is accomplished bias can lead to corruptive acts to further disadvantage a select
group of the population.

Civil Rights Movement

The civil rights campaign began in the mid-1960' s with the formation of small
groups of Catholics who attempted to achieve reform by lobbying for an end to abuses,
such as discrimination in jobs, housing, and unfair electoral procedures. Initially the
campaign was in the form of letters, pamphlets, and small local campaigns. These
attempts were largely unsuccessful. This was until the summer of 1968, when the first of
a series of civil rights marches began to take place. The marches proved to be
dramatically successful. In just over a year the movement had provoked a tension within
political and security institutions. The effectiveness of the Catholic civil right movement
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was the product of changes on three levels: "changes in underlying power relations,
conj unctural factors during the decade of the 1960's, and the specific character of the
civil rights campaign" (Raune et. al., 1993). Grievances that were addressed included
housing, industrial location, regional development, jobs in the public sector, which all
had an impact on the Catholic community.
Civil and minority rights movements were a growing trend internationally. The
1950's and 1960's provided models of non-violent protest: the Black civil rights
campaign in the United States, the struggle against apartheid South Africa (Ruane et. al,
1993; Bollens, 1999). Demonstration and marches gained worldwide attention through
publicized television broadcasts. Civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was part of
this international trend, and as a result gained wider national and international support
than traditional protest had done in the past.
Marches in Northern Ireland proved to be more problematic than in other regions
of the world. "The civil rights movement could not easily be fitted into the unionist
conceptual categories and they found it difficult to know how to respond to it: as old
fashion nationalism in a new guise or as a desire for greater equality within the union?"
(Raune et. al., 1993). Civil rights marches that traversed Protestant territory were
perceived as a direct threat to their own community. This provoked violence at interface
and flashpoint areas. At that time the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the B
Special forces were "defenders of the Protestant community first, defenders of the
Protestant state second, and normal policeman third" (Raune et. al., 1993). As a result,
security forces responded to the marches as hostile attacks often beating demonstrators
with batons and forcing them back with water cannons or rubber bullets. This was shown
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on television broadcast throughout the world, and new civil rights organizations emerged
demanding immediate response from the British government. The international· attention
proved to be successful; government inquiry into such allegations led to a system wide
restructuring process in many public and governmental agencies.
International Commonalities

Northern Ireland is only one region where ethnic conflict has dictated the amount
of control that planning agencies have over urban and regional initiatives. Other nations
have faced similar situations to varying degrees including Israel and Palestine, post
apartheid South Africa and until recently Germany. Continuing conflict has required the
on going intervention of the government to manage such critical situations. This has had
significant effects on community structure, which will continue to occur if the validity
and appropriateness of traditional planning practice is not questioned nor evaluated on its
role within the context of larger resolution strategies. It is important for the purpose of
this thesis to acknowledge that ethnic problems are a global issue and as planning cannot
be held solely responsible for resolving conflict. Likewise, not all nations are at a stage
where resolution can be achieved.
The situation in Israel and Palestine is one of the most extreme examples of where
ethnic conflict affects the daily lives of its citizens. For decades the peace movement has
made tireless efforts to gain national interest to end conflict. Today, it is still considered
a failed attempt. The current instability of the situation can be characterized as one that
Northern Ireland faced in the early 1970's at the height of the 'troubles'. At that time,
England prepared to extract all Catholics from the their nation-state and relocate them to
the Republic of Ireland (see Appendix I). "Many Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza,
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and Israel express anxiety that the Israeli government may launch mass uprooting and
expulsion" (AFSC, 2002). Today, extensive walls are being built around the Palestinians
to reduce violence (Khatib, 2003). The words and actions are literally identical, but .
unfortunately in the context of a more unstable environment. This is only one example,
which further indicates the need for resolution strategies to be incorporated into the realm
of planning in cooperation with other public and governmental agencies.
Conflict resolution strategies in these contested areas have normally been
instituted at a national or state level. "As a result of complex patterns of political and
demographic change, the nation-state is decreasingly seen as the territorial answer to the
problem of human political, economic, and social organization" (Bollens, 1999). The
deterioration of stability in many nation-states has compelled international aid
organizations, mediators, and political negotiators to look at sub-state regions and urban
areas as more appropriate scales of involvement" (Bollens, 1999). This would have
important implications on the role planning could have on the initiatives that are created
to resolve ethnic conflict. Every nation-state and the urban areas within them are
confronted with their own unique set and degree of ethnic disputes; however the basic
human psychological behaviors are all very similar. To find a solution to conflict at a
local or sub-state level could have more successful implications at a national level, and
could be accepted as an example for other nations to follow.
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Chapter Four: Urban Planning in Belfast
Political Structure and Core Planning Agencies
Political Structure

The political structure in Northern Ireland has fluctuated between various powers
of authority in an attempt to maintain stability in the province. This has made it
exceedingly difficult to determine the governmental entity in control and how decisions
are being implemented. As part of the Northern Ireland Act in 1998, the Secretary of
State, along with the House of Lords and the House of Common at Westminster,
approved a devolution order to transfer certain powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly
at Stormont (CAIN, 2003). However, the power given to the Assembly has been
suspended on several occasions, the latest being October 14th 2002. The result of these
suspensions stem from instability and general deadlock of sessions due to the lack of trust
between Protestant and Catholic political parties. At midnight on the 14th of October,
Prime Minister Tony Blair indefinitely suspended the Northern Ireland Assembly (CAIN,
2003). The following day, John Reid, Secretary of State, expanded the responsibility of
Northern Ireland Office Ministers.
The Secretary of State represents the interests of Northern Ireland in the British
Cabinet. This position, along with the legislative power of Westminster, has the authority
to suspend the more localized power of the Northern Ireland Assembly (CAIN, 2003). At
this writing, all decisions are made through the Office of Secretary of State. This office
is responsible for policing, security policy, prisons, criminal justice, international
relations, taxation, national insurance, regulation of financial services, and the regulation
29

of telecommunications and broadcasting (CAIN, 2003). Four positions under the
Secretary of State have assumed responsibility for departments formerly run through the
Assembly (See figure 4.1). Minister of State assumed responsibility for the Departments
of Education (DE), and Employment and Leaming (DEL). Other Parliamentary positions
under the Secretary have assumed responsibility over the Departments of Social
Development (DSD), Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS), Equality,
Human Rights and Community Relations (DEHRCR), Finance and Personnel (DFP),
Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI), Agriculture and Rural Development (OARD),
Economic Policy Unit and Europe, Environment (DOE), Regional Development (ORD)
and Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) (NIO, 2002). Below is an organizational chart of
political offices and departmental structure within the context of Northern Ireland.
The universal structure of political instability stems beyond national level politics
and into local level jurisdiction. For example, chairmanships on [political] committees
were held by Unionists parties at the exclusion of Nationalists including Sinn Fein, the
2nd largest party represented in the city council (Neill 1993). However, based on several
court decisions in 1 993, Sinn Fein and other Nationalist parties were no longer excluded
from council committees, or banned from civic functions, and for the first time were
permitted equal access to all political documentation (Murtagh, 1995, 2002). This has
been interpreted as a threat to Protestant's security and power. The result of shared power
gives access to sensitive documents that could be used to undermine Unionist parties, and
this ultimately weakens their sense of security. In addition, it gives new representation
on committees that were historically one sided.
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Department Enterprise, Trade & Investment
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Economic Policy Unit
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Department of Regional Development
Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure

(Source: NIO, 2003)

Figure 4.1: Political Structure & Departmental Responsibility
Public issues that have been politically controlled in the past and raise question of
equal civil rights in Belfast, and throughout Northern Ireland, include the ban of the Irish
language, the failure to recognize Gaelic sports, while in tum honoring British symbols,
such as the singing the British National Anthem and Royal toasts at all civic functions
(Neill, 1993). These actions and symbols undermine the Catholic's sense of equality,
though small achievements in equality have been achieved. In June 2002, for the first
time since the creation of the position of Lord Mayor over a century ago, a Nationalist
was elected. The Lord Mayor, Alex Maskey of the Sinn Fein political party, was
inducted into office in June 2002 (BBC News, 2002).
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With respect to urban and regional planning in Belfast and throughout Northern
Ireland, local government has little authority over the decision making process. Final
decisions in planning are made by the Department of the Environment Belfast
Development Office and the Northern Ireland Housing Executive. These agencies often
sub-contract projects out to consulting firms who follow guidelines established by the
Royal Town Planning Institute. Due to the centralized power of the DOE and the
regional NIHE, many private firms are restricted as to how a project will be conducted.
This also holds true for academia. Universities are dependant on the DOE for research
funds and cannot afford the luxury of taking a critical position "for fear of biting off the
hand that feeds it" (Neill, 1993). Due to harsh public criticism over inequality over the
last several decades, professional planners have often marginalized their work in an effort
to maintain a safe balance on social issues. This approach has prolonged and enhanced
the underlying social problems that so famously plague Northern Ireland.
Department of the Environment Belfast Development Office

The Department of Environment (DOE) makes all the final decisions concerning
planning issues throughout the United Kingdom. The pivotal agency within the DOE
responsible for the planning of Belfast is the Belfast Development Office (BDO). The
DOE is in effect an extension of central British administration under the control of
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It has been described as having the
administrative responsibility for all the strategic planning in Northern Ireland. The
functions of the BDO include designing policy for the development and redevelopment of
the city and where necessary creating the legislative framework for the implementation of
that policy (Neill, 1993).
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In addition, the BDO facilitates meetings with various coordinating groups, which
bring together government ministers and their officials, both administrative and
professional, with representatives of Belfast City Council, statutory boards, trade unions,
chamber of commerce, retailers, banks and professional institutions (Murtagh, 1995).
These agencies are identified as stakeholders in the planning process. For example, the
Office of Security under direct control of the Secretary of State is responsible for the
authorization of 'peace lines' and the specific locations they would be built (NIHE,
2001).

In addition, corporate developers have in the past had their own interests

supported when consulted on planning matters. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, when
'reimaging' and privatization was at the forefront of planning initiatives, developers had
access to closed planning meetings and were later contracted for those projects (Neill,
1993).
The Housing Executive

The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) is not under direct control of the
Secretary of State, however many of the policies and initiatives undertaken are influenced
through governmental funding and an interconnected relationship with the Department of
Social Development. The Housing Executive reports directly to a board, which is
established through the Housing Commission. The Housing Commission established
under the 1971 Housing Executive Act are consulted on all matters concerning the NIHE
(NIHE, 2003). The commission is made up of 10 members seven of which are
appointed the other three are nominated (NIHE, 2003). (See figure 4.2 NIHE
organizational chart)
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Figure 4.2: Northern Ireland Housing Executive Organizational Chart
As the government was breaking down and a mass population movement was
occurring in 1969, so too was deterioration in housing and the need to make significant
progress overwhelming. Many homes were overcrowded with little indoor plumbing and
poor electrical and heating infrastructure. In the height of "the troubles", as life seemed
bleak at best, a force of determination in improving housing conditions emerged. These
conditions lead to the Housing Executive Act of 1971. Two people, one from the
Ministry of Development and another from the Housing Trust, formed the NIHE (Brett,
1986). It resulted in an unprecedented act of an entire restructuring of a public
administrative office in Northern Ireland. By late 1971, the first hearing on future
housing principles and policies took place. Though many policies have been criticized in
regards to discrimination, many improvements have been made in the form of low
interest loans and housing grants for improvement, upgrading and rehabilitation to
infrastructure. The NilIE is also responsible for managing public sector housing, which
is largely located in close proximity to interface areas. It has been a slow process of
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improving housing conditions, and taken many years for the large-scale benefits to
emerge. As of 2001, the Housing Executive manages over 30,000 dwelling units in the
Belfast urban area (NIHE, 2001).
The Northern Ireland Housing Executive is responsible for public sector housing
management and improvements as well as private sector investments in the form of loans
and grants. The NIHE has suffered the same criticism as other agencies, and as a result,
the agency is determined to ensure equality between communities by building homes
from a standard template. " Blandness has prevailed in public sector and the Housing
Executive happily admits it is a "housing factory'' with only 24 housing types" (CMP
Information Ltd., 2002). With over 30,000 homes and only 24 housing types, both
communities are disadvantaged. Entire communities are left architecturally stale and lack
the vibrancy and character that shapes cohesive residential communities.
Planning Initiatives

Focus on Privatization and the Central Business District

Between 1970 and 1975, the IRA bombing campaign destroyed nearly 300
establishments in the Belfast city center and over a quarter of retail space (Neill, 1993).
As a result, defensive strategies and policies were initiated to minimize conflict. In 1978,
a review of the city's transportation strategies recommended a high-grade motorway.
This initiative was the Westlink motorway that runs to the North and West of the city
center. This created a divide between two high profile areas, the Falls and Shankill
communities, well known for their riot activities. In addition, the Secretary of State, Roy
Mason, established a committee to examine how to bring life back to the city and give it a
brighter look. An external examination was also conducted to explore government
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partnerships with private developers to redevelop the city center. As a result, a
beautification plan along the river Lagan was proposed. The failure behind these projects
was the lack of response to critical social problems.
The re-imaging of Belfast city center was further encouraged between 1980 and
1984, which can be contributed in part to a'change in paramilitary strategy away from
commercial bombing towards attacks on security forces and other state personnel (Neill,
1993). In part, this led to a relaxation of policies restricting city center curfews. As a
result, retail businesses were operating with longer hours and many eating establishments
reopened. Life in the city began to reemerge. Urban regeneration focused its attention
on the expansion of the retail economy and office development. While this generated
city council optimism, it also raised questions of sustainability. By 1985, the Belfast
Urban Area Plan was published, a plan that focused strictly on 'reimaging' the city with
little regard to the communities fundamental problems. In 1994, it was evident that the
r�tail expansion had reached a plateau (Murtagh, 1995). Rental growth was fairly static
and well-established businesses, dating bac� to the Victorian ages, closed their doors,
unable to compete with corporate �evelop�ent.
The year 1991 was another major image-promoting year for Northern Ireland in
general and Be�fast in particular. A review of Belfast' city commercial property market
uncovered a shift in development focus from retail to office uses. In addition, the
Northern Ireland Department of Economic Development (1989) identified 'image' as the
Province's major tourist marketing handicap. A new city plan was developed with a ten
year time frame with a goal recreating an image of Belfast. Its horizon was chosen in
attempt to correlate the rate of urban change envisioned for Belfast and the lure of a new
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century approaching. The DOE released a preliminary report on the production of a
Belfast City Center Local Plan, in which its final form was published in 1994 (Neill,
1993). The central aim was to "improve the world-wide image of the city-center" by
among other things "creating a number of memorable places, buildings, and events and
providing high quality shopping, leisure and tourist facilities to make the city an
international center" (Neill, 1993).
Several projects were singled out for improvements based on economic and
historic images in the city. One such project was the Castle Court shopping center (see
Figure 4.3). The renovations to the site proved to be a success and were heralded by city
leaders. People returned in mass to shop at the new center. This was one indication that
the city was returning to normality after two decades of violence. Another venture was
the Laganside project that taps into the maritime tradition of Belfast (see Figure 4.4).
The Laganside Harbor was the site of construction for the legendary ship Titanic. The
project's aim was to transform a neglected waterfront area by creating interconnecting
areas of commercial, retail, light industrial, recreation and leisure uses. Work began on
the 100 million dollar project in 1992, with a completion targeted in 1996 (Neil, 1993).
Public donation strengthened both projects in the form of infrastructure and
environmental improvements. In light of these improvements, Belfast continues to be
laden with symbols of British identity; The Cranes of Harland and Wolff symbolizing to
residents that the Laganside Harbor is still Protestant territory, and the official statues and
street names of British origination are liberally represented in the city center.
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(CAIN, 2003)

(CAIN, 2002)

Figure 4.3 : Castle Court on Royal Avenue Figure 4.4: Laganside Development

The theme surrounding the 'reimaging' of the city was "Belfast The Capital of
Culture". However, those involved with implementing the plan did not consider or
choose to ignore the deeper more critical concerns of ethnic conflict. Critics argued that
the plan for the city center needed to be concerned with more fundamental issues and not
superficial image (Neill, 1993). In sectarian terms it is not neutral territory. For a
considerable time after the Anglo-Irish Agreement, at the instigation of Unionist City
Councilors, a "Belfast Says No" banner was draped across the front of the city hall
building, a public institution that until recently continued to fly the Union Jack. The
banner indicated to both governments and the general public that the Unionists disliked
the clause in the Anglo-Irish Agreement that underscored the importance of shared
political power (Neill, 1 993). Within the constitutional arrangement at that time, cultural
equality was impossible. It could not accommodate the conflicting identities that existed
behind clashes of conventional ideology in Belfast. In this situation, the plan for "image"
was a failure. It did not address the all too real ethnic division that existed. The Northern
Ireland Tourist Board, in a shocking yet sobering statement, announced that "there could
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well be a niche market in attracting the gaze of the curious 'terror tourist' (Magee and
McGuckin, 1992). As one journalist suggested, "the macho prestige of holidaying in real
live, but generally safe to bystanders, war threatens to turn Belfast into a terrorism theme
park" (Margolis, 1993). Therefore, it can be argued that perhaps too much concentration
on superficially 'reimaging' the city in the eyes of both Belfast residents, potential
tourists, and investors was a distraction from dealing with real and deeply felt ethnic
antagonisms (Neill, 1993).
It can be argued that in a very weak regional economy, the main beneficiaries of
the Belfast's Urban Area Plan for 'reimaging' have been the middle class whose income
has been substantially strengthened· with high public spending on construction and who
enjoy low cost housing, as well as the developers who took part in the planning process.
However, the inability of the strategy to bring qualitative change in the social situation
placed serious weight on the possibility of mobilizing consent behind a policy of
planning for neutrality (Neill, 1993).
The government was then pressured to focus its energy on greater public interest
programs concerned with more practical matters, such as housing programs, economic
strategies, and conflict management. Persistent unemployment and poverty led to
criticism of the government's reliance on private sector development, largely shaped by
the United States model of trickle-down economics (Neill, 1993), as a means to recovery.
In response, a government program was created in 1988, known as "Making Belfast
Work". It aimed to "stimulate greater economic activity, reinforce local enterprise,
improve the quality of the environment and equip people with skills to compete
successfully for available employment" (Northern Ireland Information Service, 1988).
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"Making Belfast Work", though not a planning initiative, targeted communities
with high levels of unemployment and poverty. Money was spent on school equipment,
local health care facilities, environmental h?provements, job clu�s, and adult education
programs. Economic measures included the upgrading of training, and improvement in
literacy and mathematics. A review of the program in 1993 concluded that no significant
progress had been made in improving unemployment rates (Murtagh, 1995). It was
further criticized for the lack of support that the government contributed financially in
relation to the scale and complexity of the problem. In addition, the objectives were too
varied, which led to a lack of focus in the program and to its abolishment in 1997.
Planning for Conflict

The most dramatic period of population movement, as a result of ethnic turmoil in
Belfast, came between 1969 and 1973 when an estimated 60,000 people left their homes
(Murtagh, 1995). The concentration of movement came from working class areas of
North, West, and East Belfast as a result of intens� conflict be�een the Protestant and
Catholic communities. In consequence to the violence, Northern Ireland Office of
Security and the Newly formed Housing executive constructed thirteen 'peace lines' (see
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5). 'Peace lines' ar� tall physical barriers constructed of concrete
and metal to separate opposing communities. (see Figure 4.6 and 4.7) According to the
BDO, the cost of construction was nearly two million dollars (Murtagh, 1995). The
'peace lines' had varying effects on both the neighboring communities and government
services. It created a negative economic impact due to the loss of annual rent income
either from residents choosing to relocate to amore safe environment or from restricted
access to nearby commercial services. Most property at interface areas is owned and
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Table 4.1: Belfast 'Peace Lines' and Adjacent Neighborhoods

....

-

Adjacent Neighborhoods
Protestant

Peace line
North Belfast

Catholic

Alliance/Glenbryn
Elimgrove Street
Manor/Roe Street
Duncairn Gardens
Crumlin Road
West Belfast
Unity Flats
Northumberland/ Ardmoulin
Cupar Way
Ainsworth Avenue
Springhill Avenue
Springmartin Road
East Belfast
Lower Newtownards Road
Bryson Street
Cluan Place

Ardoyne
Oldpark Avenue
Roseleigh
New Lodge
Ardoyne

Alliance
Torrens
Groomsport Court
Tiger's Bay
Shankill

Unity Flats
Divis Flats
Falls
Springdale
Ballymurphy
New Barnsley

Lower Shankill
Shankill
Shankill
Woodvale
Springmartin
Springmartin

Short Strand
Short Strand
Short Strand

Island
Ballymacarett
Cluan Place
(Source: Murtagh, 2002)

Peaee llne

To Stewartstown
Road

(Source: Murtagh, 2002)

Figure 4.5: Location of 'Peace Lines' Belfast Urban Area
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(CAIN, 2003)

Figure Jt.6: Example of a 'peace line' in
North Belfast.

(CAIN, 2003)

Figure 4. 7: Example of 'peace line' Gate that
restricts access in and out of interface
communities.

controlled by the NIHE. In addition, surplus land set aside for public housing was lost, a
total property value of $400,000 (Murtagh, 1995), and local retail, services, and facilities
were severely limited. Many of these businesses were forced to close or relocate.
However, the psychological, physical, and economical impact on residents was the most
serious.
International media attention reporting on the conflict and the construction of
'peace lines' further proves the central position of 'reimaging' should not be the primary
focus of planning policy in Belfast if it does not include resolution strategies. The harsh
image of 'peace lines' promoted planning professionals to formulate design guidelines to
soften the tone of hard concrete and steel frames by replacing them with colored brick,
pastel renderings and extensive landscape.
More recently, land acquisition has been used in an attempt to 'reimage' interface
zones. Light industrial and commercial land uses provide an alternative buffer between
two communities and at the same time dismantle the harsh image of a peace line. This
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type of approach is described as 'wedge planning' where land uses are used to create a
buffer between residential areas to cope with conflict. However, this is still a superficial
response to the complex problems that characterize life within these communities.
Based on empirical survey data, Brendan Murtagh ( 1995) suggests, " that
effective and efficient movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic and the orderly
management of resources, services and facilities have been at the core of planning
practice and education". However, minority communities surrounded by 'peace lines'
experience significant problems in activities such as getting to work, visiting friends and
relatives and gaining access to health services and recreational facilities. In part, many
people experience high poverty rates, which further limits their access to other benefits.
These areas may have experienced high poverty levels before 'peace lines' existed,
however these physical structures further hinder innovative improvements. The image
and level of development of community infrastructure (i.e. 'peace line', and public
facilities/services) limit solutions to local economic development opportunities.
Economic indicators show that these areas have higher unemployment rates, have lower
income, and have lower A level (high school) educational attainment. In addition,
Catholic communities have higher levels of housing waiting lists, lower vacancy rates,
and better correspondence between household size and property size (NISRA, 2001),
which can all be attributed to the growing Catholic population. While on the other side
of the peace line, Protestant's complain that their communities are full of bricked up
homes, boarded up businesses, and vacant land because their residents are moving out of
these areas for security reasons. These extreme polar situations are a clear indication of
the public's need in both communities for successful planning strategies.
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Planning Problems

Unlike traditional planning practice, which assumes the stability in institutional
structures, contested cities must plan under conditions of instability and uncertainty.
Given this situation, critical evaluation must question the very basis of traditional
planning practice. Urban planning in Northern Ireland has focused on technical aspects
in planning and has avoided any discussion concerning more anthropocentric issues.
Furthermore, it has been ambivalent towards how the built environment should be
structured when ethnic conflict is present. For example, where ethnic conflict is
prevalent, physical barriers are constructed to separate opposing groups. The focus,
largely driven by the Office of Security, is placed upon minimizing the current conflict.
This serves immediate needs for safety and security; however it creates long-term
negative implications in terms of public needs.
The City of Belfast has indicated that the wishes to promote itself as one of
culture. 'Reimaging' the city alone will not succeed in achieving this vision. If Belfast
was able build an image based upon resolved differences, it wo�ld have a better chance at
promoting itself as the 'City of Culture'. A trend that has emerged in the planning field is
to create a central image of a community based upon a unique quality. Belfast, instead of
capitalizing on the 'terror tourist', could create an industry around peace-building,
functioning as model for other contested communities to follow. Belfast could become
the center for international peace-keeping and conflict resolution forum, similar to
Geneva Switzerland which has successfully promoted itself as "the forum for world
negotiation" (Geneva Welcome Center, 2002). The only way to achieve a vision such as
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this is to incorporate conflict resolution strategies into urban planning policies, which
reach into nearly every function within the city.
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Chapter Five: Human Behavior, Conflict, and Resolution
Human Behavior
Conflicting perceptions and attitudes between ethnic groups is not a unique
phenomenon to Northern Ireland, as illustrated by the example of Israel/Palestine. These
feelings are the result of a more deeply rooted ethos between man and the environment
(Ittelson, 1974). The environment is interpreted as the physical surroundings within
which humans live. In understanding the complexities of social conflict, it is important
to identify how man interacts with the environment, shaping it and being shaped by it
(lttelson, 1974). The identification of a few basic assumptions about this fundamental
psychology underscores the complexities of common behaviors associated with the
conflict in Northern Ireland:
1. A person experiences the environment through all the senses, which
determines a particular response;
2. People are part of a larger system and how a person acts within it
determines the setting;
3 . The physical environment can influence human behavior in many ways
and to various degrees;
4. The physical environment is fully intertwined to self-awareness;
5. The environment is often unnoticed until significant change occurs and
adaptation takes place;
6. "The observed environment is not necessarily the real environment";
7. The environment can be understood as a set of mental images that vary
from one individual or group to another;
8. The environment has symbolic value to each individual person.
(Ittelson et. al., 197 4)
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Based upon these assumptions, if similar conceptions about the environment are
not shared then there is a potential for conflict to occur. There are fundamental
behavioral factors that ultimately affect conflict at varying stages and to different
degrees, which have implications on effective resolution. These include those in relation
to man and his environment, as well as behavior attributed to human interaction. A list of
these factors is identified below to provide a comprehensive outline of potential behavior
characteristics that are identified in conflict theory and the course towards resolution.
1. Cooperation-Competition., Actions that determine the course of conflict as a
constructive problem-solving accomplishment or a competitive win-lose or more
appropriately lose-lose product.
2. Social Justice: Each group or individual has a unique perception of what is fair
resolution.
3. Motivation: Each group has associated needs. In order to achieve resolution
these needs have to be identified as those that foster conflict or are fostered by
conflict.
4. Trust: Distrust is destructive to the process of resolution. For resolution to occur
an attempt is needed to identify the processes that foster trust and those that
reinforce distrust.
5. Communication: Misunderstanding can lead to conflict, which can lead to the
deterioration of communication.
6. Attribution Processes: Emotional responses toward the opposing group are
influenced by what intentions are attributed to them and the degree of
responsibility that is imposed upon them.

1. Persuasion: Efforts are often channeled into persuading the opposition of the

soundness of one position.

8. Self Control: Effective resolution actions require self-control. Distractions,
unexpected events, and emotions (i.e. rage, pride, anxiety) can lead to loss of the
important long-term goals.
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9. Power: The distribution of power and how it is engaged influences the conflict
resolution process. Power (e.g. economic resources, information, legitimate
authority) determines the degree of influence over all those involved in the
conflict.
1 0. Violence: A destructive course of actions that result from conflict.
1 1. Judgmental Biases: Misunderstandings, misperceptions, and potential biases
interfere with the constructive resolution process.
12. Personality: Individual personalities influence their decisions and actions as well
as those of others, which have a powerful affect of how resolution takes place.
(Deutsch et. al., 2000)
This has important implications when attempting to understand territoriality of
groups. In the context of Belfast's interface communities, the sense of identity is
territory. To lose territory is to lose one's identity. In Northern Ireland this is associated
to ethnic/religious identity. The Protestants are in fear of losing their territory, while the
Catholics are outraged by the lack of control over territory. This equates to the
Protestant's need for security and the Catholics need of equality. Defense is a
mechanism used by individuals or groups to maintain its territorial integrity (Porteous,
1977). Understanding the psychology intrinsic to individual and group response of
territory will help practitioners understand the insecurities of both communities, which
will contribute to a better approach in planning.
" The value of perception, attitude, and preference studies for planning lies, first
in discovering regularities and consistencies in behavior from empirical studies, and
second, in sensitizing planners to individual and group differences" (Porteous, 1977). In
planning terms, individual and group enlightenment may be achieved by discoveries of
perceptions in both problems and solutions that differ between individuals and groups.
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This can be a powerful cognitive tool in planning. There are, however, several problems
and limitations that impact the effectiveness and reliability of the information being
received from participants; information can be easily misrepresented or skewed; the
measurability of attitudes and perceptions is debatable, and at best can only be measured
through observation; "bias is inevitable"; and continuous questions and interviews can
lead to an unwillingness to participate (Porteous, 1977). To overcome such limitations,
there needs to be a synthesis between theory and practice, in which science and practical
experience collectively contribute to the overall objective.
Conflict Theory and Practice

There are as many definitions for conflict as there are theories, but for the purpose
here conflict can be defined as the stage at which the relationship between two
interdependent groups are in total disagreement over shared territory, resources, and the
power over both. "The conflict in Northern Ireland is at its very basic a struggle between
those who wish to see Northern Ireland remain part of the United Kingdom and those
who wish to see the reunification of the island of Ireland"(Deutsh et. al., 2000). This
single assumption is the motive behind every approach to conflict resolution, which has
always materialized from a national, multi-national, and/or international level. Greater
emphasis towards resolution should be focused at the local level where territory is at the
root of every public decision. In this case, when decisions are made, one group will not
be compromised at the expense of another or marginalized by the decision maker in an
attempt to avoid persecution. This only prolongs problems and further exacerbates the
conflict.
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There are a number of problems in the planning field (i.e. housing, economic
development, and public infrastructure) because agencies have focused on technical
aspects and evaded the social implications of many former projects. The solution is in
the problem. The only foreseeable way to correct these problems is to move away from
marginalized planning where decisions are based on strategies to cope with violence, and
allow room for new strategies to be developed that incorporate conflict resolution into the
planning process. To accomplish this the planner must take on the role of social scientist
and practitioner of conflict resolution at a community level. Here, simple changes can
make a difference in the outcome of the larger social problem that exists in Northern
Ireland.
There are inevitable differences between theory and practice of the conflict theory
discourse. As in many social science disciplines, there is a disconnect between science
and practice. Science is criticized as being impractical, while aversely the practitioner is
regarded as unscientific (Isenhart et. al., 2000). To engage in a conflict resolution
strategy that is centered upon deeply embedded ethos of power, security, territory, and
ethnic/religious identity it will require a synthesis of both scientific theory and practical
application. This is required to achieve a truly successful conflict resolution. A
practitioner must take into account the many theories of conflict and pull practical
information from each with relevance to the given situation. There is no well defined
procedure for accomplishing such a complex task. Morton Deutsch (2000) points out that
practitioners often work intuitively without being able to specify precisely how they are
weaving together the theoretical ideas being utilized. It is for this reason that a synthesis
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of ideas obtained from multiple and overlapping theories is used to provide relevant
knowledge that can equip planners with practical strategies for resolving conflict.
Theories of Conflict

Historically, the study of conflict has been revisited time and again with such
names as Charles Darwin with survival of the fittest; Karl Marx with the Communist
Manifesto and class struggle; as well as Sigmund Freud with his theory of psychosexual
development of struggle between biological id and social determination and the superego
(Deutsch, 2000). Many of their ideas were manipulated into other forms of rationale
where new evolutionary forms of empirical orientated and socio-psychological theories
began to emerge. These theories are closely connected to social behaviors discussed
earlier and in their own form resemble the conflict dynamics that are occurring in
Northern Ireland. These theories include:
I . Attribution Theory: This perspective is based on attribution processes, which
proposes that individuals make sense of their world by assigning qualities and
causes to others based on what is relevant to them. Many Protestants and
Catholics commonly attribute their current situation based on the blame assigned
to the opposing group. For example, instead of seeing the problem of vandalism
as youthful misconduct they assign blame to an entire ethic group.
2. Equity Theory: This theory views conflict from the perspective of social justice,
where each group perceives fair resolution differently. For example, one
community may feel that they are not receiving or are restricted from adequate
public services while to another group these amenities appear readily accessible.
3. Field Theory: This perspective views people's actions as a product of contextual
forces. The forces are those impulses that are performed and those that are not
performed. In the case of Northern Ireland, many Catholics are frustrated over
the benefits that Protestants have received for their loyalty to Britain.
4. Interactional Theory: This theory views conflict as a process of ongoing
negotiation about what is valued, how behaviors are interpreted, and the meaning
of events. As Levi Strauss stated, "People create the situations they perceive, and
what they perceive is also influenced by what they do" (Isenhart et. al., 2000).
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The ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland is a common part of every day life and it
therefore dictates what residents do. For example, instead of using the most direct
route to walk through a neighborhood in order to access public transportation, a
person may walk another mile out of the way to avoid from walking through a
community not their own for fear of harassment or physical attack.
5. Phase Theory: This theory is described through the series of events that develop
over an extended period of time. Though scholars argue on the name and amount
of phases that occur. Three common aspects are agreed upon: conflict proceeds
through a predictable sequence of behaviors; behaviors that instigate conflict can
be identified; and specific behaviors perpetuate the continuation and escalation of
conflict. In the case of Northern Ireland there is a clear sequence of events that
have shaped the dynamics of how individuals interact and perceive their
environment.
6. Psvchodynamic Theory: This theory goes back to psychologists and social
scientists such as Freud who believe that people identify problems from an
internal subconscious state (e.g. anxiety, ego, fear). Based on this theory it is
believed that those involved in conflict will engage in compulsive and repetitive
acts despite the knowledge that such behaviors are counterproductive. This is
seen each summer as Orange Order marches take place throughout Northern
Ireland. Many of the marchers hold positions vital to resolving conflict (i.e.
political office and public service), however each year they continue to march
through Catholic communities chanting blasphemous slogans.
7. Social Exchange Theory: This perspective of conflict is viewed similar to a
market analysis. People make choices based on self-interest; they weigh options
to determine the cost of actions. Under such a theory, compromises as a set of
trade-offs are the most valuable tool. For Protestants, the fear of sharing power
and losing control is too much of a cost, and therefore choices are made to protect
their security. For Catholics it is equality.
8. Systems Theory: This view takes the perspective that there are units of an
interrelated system, which influence each other and function within a larger
system. Three categories describe a system breakdown: transactional redundancy,
a subsystem becomes ineffective, and members of a system exceed their roles.
9. Tranformational Theory: This theory focuses more on change and process than
on explanations of how conflict occurs. This perspective accounts for the
dynamic, changing quality of roles, relationships, and expectations and the
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environment in which all these exist. This is· evident in the ever-changing
dynamics of the relationship between the Catholic and Protestant communities,
which are perpetuated by a series of changes in governmental structures to protect
their own integrity and control the larger population.
(Isenhart et. al., 2000)

As indicated by the number of possible theories, there are a variety of
perspectives of how and why conflict occurs. The focus of conflict can be identified by
the way in which individuals or groups identify themselves and/or others· within a given
situation, as described in attribution, equity, and interactional theories; or conflict can be
viewed as a series of behavioral actions and events as described in phase, system, and
transformational theories. Together, these theories provide a broad and holistic
understanding of the various directions and associations that conflict can arise from.
With this in mind, steps to combat conflict from its most fundamental sources can be
more readily achieved.
Strategies for Conflict Resolution

Ellen Raider and Susan Coleman (1997) developed a sequence of conflict
resolution models for an International Negotiation Training Manual. The format of this
manual is geared for training in consecutive three to six day workshops, however these
models also work well incorporating into the planning process. These models provide a
coherent system for achieving resolution that if paralleled with the planning process
could provide planners with a framework that would supplement traditional planning.
Illustrated below are the models used in the training manual, as well as a description of
the functions they serve. The next chapter will describe in further detail how these
models can be incorporated into the planning process.
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The Conflict Resolution Continuum: provides a means for achieving an overview of the

conflict by examining existing attitudes as well as formulating a general strategy that will
determine the appropriate method for procedure (See Figure 5 .1). There are several
functions that this process can serve:
1 . It establishes who the stakeholders are, and the existing attitudes they have to

the current problem.

2. It helps to create a baseline assessment to determine strengths and

weaknesses.

3. It helps diagnose discrepancies between what is perceived and what is actually

being proposed.

4. It provides consequences of different approaches.
5. It provides a vision for the project.

Negotiation: is the process of problem-solving through collaboration. Through this

process disputed parties exchange information and identify common problems and
interests, and develop solutions that have mutual gains for each party. Part of this
process requires that each party seek beneficial trade-offs and compromises. "Effective
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Figure 5.1: The Conflict Resolution Continuum Model
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negotiation depends on the ability of parties to share information about needs, issues, and
interest" (Deutsch, 2000). Table 5.1 compares the elements between competitive and
collaborative negotiation elements.
Competitive to Collaborative Re{raming: Figure 5.2 serves as a framework to understand

the elements of negotiation. This model creates a reference for distinguishing the needs
of each group and how to reframe conflict from a competitive position to a collaborative
one based on understanding and acknowledgement of underlying views. Once needs have
been identified, they can collectively begin to be prioritized through a series of
compromises, the "bargaining'' process.
Mediation: is the process in which disputes are resolved with the assistance of a neutral

third party (See Figure 5.3). The objective in this process is to help opposing sides find
acceptable solutions to their conflict and "counter tendencies toward competitive win
lose strategies and objectives" (Deutsh, 2000). Mediation is not the solution to all
conflicts. Eight elements are identified for determining the use of mediation:
1. The parties can identified.
2. They are interdependent.
3. They have basic cognitive, interpersonal, and emotional capabilities to
represent themselves.
4. They have interests that are not entirely incompatible.
5. They face alternatives to consensual agreement that are undesirable.
6. There are existing interpersonal barriers.
7. There are existing substantive barriers.
8. There are existing procedural barriers.
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Table 5.1 Competitive and Collaborative Negotiation Elements
Competitive

Positional Discussion
Forcing
Intimidation
Devaluing Others
Win-Lose Attitude
Information Hiding
Personal Gains
Self-Focused
Self-Interests
Power Over Others

Group A

Position

Underlying
needs

Collaborative

Interest-Focused Discussion
Problem Solving
Arguments Based On Merit
Valuing Others
Win-Win Attitude
Information Sharing
Joint Gains
Empathy and Understanding
Joint Interests
Power shared
(Source: Isenhart et.al., 2000)

I

Group B

Position

Old frame
(Competition)

Underlying
needs

/

How can we satisfy the priority underlying needs of
Group A and Group B?

Reframe
(Collaboration)

(Source: Ellen Raider International, Inc., 1 997)

Figure 5.2: Competition to Collaboration Reframing Model
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Twelve Stages of Mediation
Stage 1 : Establishing relationship with disputing parties
• Make initial contacts with the parties
• Build credibility
• Promote rapport
• Educate the parties about the process
• Increase commitment to the procedure
Stage 2:
•
•
•

Selecting a strategy to guide mediation
Assist the parties to assess various approaches to conflict management and resolution
Assist the parties in selecting an approach
Coordinate the approaches of the parties

Stage 3: Collecting and analyzing background information
• Collect and analyze relevant data about the people, dynamics, and substance of a conflict
• Verify accuracy in data
• Minimize the impact of inaccurate or unavailable data
Stage 4: Designing a detailed plan for mediation
• Identify strategies and consequent noncontingent strategies that enable the parties to
move toward agreement
• Identify contingent strategies to respond to situations peculiar to the specific conflict
Stage 5: Building trust and cooperation
• Prepare disputants psychologically to participate in negotiations on substantive issues
• Handle strong emotions
• Check perceptions and minimize effects of stereotypes
• Build recognition of the legitimacy of the parties and issues
• Build trust
• Clarify communications
Stage 6: Beginning the mediation session
• Open negotiation between parties
• Establish an open and positive tone
• Establish ground rules and behavioral guidelines
• Assist the parties in venting emotions
• Delimit topic areas and issues for discussion
• Assist the parties in exploring commitments, salience, and influence
Stage 7:
•
•
•

Defining issues and setting an agenda
Identify broad topic areas of concern to the parties
Obtain agreement on the issues to be discussed
Determine the sequence for handling the issues

Stage 8: Uncovering hidden interests of the disputing parties
• Identify the substantive, procedural, and psychological interests of the parties
• Educate the parties about each other's interests

Figure 5.3 : Twelve Stages of Mediation

58

(Continued)
Stage 9: Generating options for settlement
• Develop an awareness among the parties of the need for multiple opinions
• Lower commitment to positions or sole alternatives
• Generate options using either positional or interest based bargining
Stage 10: Assessing options for settlement
• Review the interests of the parties
• Assess how interests can be met by available options
• Assess the costs and benefits of selecting options
Stage 1 1 : Final bargaining
• Reach agreement through incremental convergence of positions, final leaps to package
settlements, develop of a consensual approach, or establishment of procedural means to
reach substantive agreement.
Stage 12: Achieving formal settlement
• Identify procedural steps to operationalize the agreement
• Establish an evaluation-an-monitoring procedure
• Formalize the settlement and create enforcement-and-commitment mechanism
(source: Deutsh, 2000)

Figure 5 .3 (continued)

Arbitration: is the process of third party intervention to recommend a contractual

decision. This tool for resolution should not be used until both negotiation and mediation
have proven unsuccessful. The best conditions for arbitration:
Parties are deadlocked after an attempted negotiation or mediation;
Parties will not have to maintain a relationship after the dispute is resolved;
Legal issues predominate over factual issues;
Parties have dramatically differing appraisals of the case's fact and how the
law might apply;
5. Parties have a history of acting in bad faith in negotiations;
6. An immediate decision by a third party neutral is needed to protect the
interests of a disputant.

1.
2.
3.
4.

(source: Isenhart et. al., 2000)

Further Considerations

Theoretically, the process of resolving conflict seems self evident as do the
practical tools; however there is no escape from uncertainties. Human behavior is
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unpredictable. Therefore, it is important to consider the barriers, limitations and hazards
to conflict resolution. Many-barriers associated with effective strategies stem from
competitive and destructive behaviors. For example, if disputed parties experience a
sense of being over-powered a breakdown in communication is likely to occur. In
addition, if disputants feel that the problem is too complex then they may lose interest or
motivation to participate. The possibilities are endless to potential discursive actions;
therefore practitioners or third party facilitators must be prepared to simplify and/or shift
direction in communication at any given time within the process. Other potential barriers
include lack of correct or sufficient information, political obstacles and funding.
As in any situation of conflict, safety should always be given consideration.
Those who take leadership and third party roles are most at risk because they challenge
traditional ways of thinking. Though in Northern Ireland the risk associated with
resolution initiatives have been relatively low, the potential for harm still exists.
"Leaders and authority figures get attacked, dismissed, silenced, and sometimes
assassinated because they come to represent loss, real or perceived, to those members of
the community who feel that they have gotten, or might get, the bad end of a bargain"
(Heifetz, 1994). The realities of change can provoke passionate emotions and resistance.
"Knowing how hard to push and when to let up are central to leadership" (Heifetz, 1994).
One way to achieve this objective is to facilitate challenging issues over a longer period
of time, while achieving less objectionable goals in the short term. In this approach,
communities are more likely to be tolerable of change. Most importantly, being
conscious of behavior and patterns of change is the most cognitive skill to possess in
order to insure one's own safety and the safety of others.
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Chapter Six: Planning Principles that Support Conflict Resolution
Conflict Resolution in Planning

It is clear that agencies and professionals in the planning field have a vested
interest in resolving conflict at the local and regional level. Urban planning, thus far, has
been criticized for its lack of investment in anthropocentric issues. Planning agencies
throughout the United Kingdom are technocratic and centralized in organizational
structure. This is exhibited in plans and polices thus far that have concentrated on
technical analysis in making decisions. Improvements have focused on rebuilding image.
This has been appealing to middle and upper middle-income residents who benefit
economically from investment, but it has been proven largely not helpful to the majority.
Furthermore, planning has been ambivalent to the built environment associated with
conflict. 'Peace lines' restrict community access to basic public amenities and the
development of social housing lacks any variation in design. The lack of social
consideration has enhanced class division, failed to stimulate local economic activities or
reduce poverty rates, restricted access to public amenities and services, and further
divided the large ethnic populations. From this perspective, these problems have
unnecessarily sustained conflict.
The organizational problem is that Northern Ireland is notably different from the
rest of the U.K., and therefore traditional planning practice is not enough to ensure

•

successful urban development. There needs to be a greater commitment on the
fundamental social issues that have largely shaped the urban community. Conflict
resolution not only builds stronger relationships it builds stronger communities. If
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planners were to incorporate conflict resolution strategies into their plans they would be
more successful in achieving goals and objectives. The illustration (Figure 6.1) below is
an example of how planners can incorporate conflict resolution theory into the traditional
planning process, which will synthesize technical analysis and anthropocentric elements
to create a holistic plan rather than one laden with one-sided outcomes.
Figure 6.1 represents a feasible framework for which to incorporate conflict
resolution into the planning process. The inner circle is a model of the comprehensive
planning process. There are five basic steps represented, which include research, goals
and objectives, plan formulation, implementation, and review and revise. This model
also illustrates that planning is an ongoing process, and to be effective it must flow
through a continual evolution. In order for it to function effectively, all stakeholders
must be identified and equally included in the planning process.
1 . Research Phase: A fact-gathering phase that enables a planner to make

knowledgeable decisions. In this phase opportunities, issues and assumptions are
identified and made.
2. Goals & Objectives Phase: The phase where data is analyzed, community goals and

objectives are clarified and formalized. Goals and objectives are often revised several
times before being officially accepted.
3. Plan Formulation Phase: In this phase, alternative ideas are pursued to determine

the most feasible means for achieving goals. Scenarios are developed to determine
future patterns. A plan is then formulated based on the best alternative.
4. Implementation Phase: The phase where the plan is put into action.
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AsS&rtion

(Source: Author, 2003)

Figure: 6. 1 : Concentric Model for Conflict Resolution & Planning
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5. Review & Revise Phase: Once the plan has been implemented it can then be

evaluated based on measurable objectives. The objectives help to determine whether
the plan is meeting its intended goals. Adjustments to the plan can then be made
accordingly to improve the overall performance.
The outer ring represents the appropriate resolution strategies to be utilized during
the planning process. It is divided into six sections; assertion, facilitation, consensus
building, negotiation and mediation, arbitration and evaluation. These sections are based
upon the Raider Conflict Resolution Continuum Model (1997). Each of the six tools are
located within the planning process at the phase they are likely to have the most
beneficial effect, however it should be noted that they are not exclusive to their specific
location within the model, and may prove to be useful at varying stages in the planning
process. At the core of this model, the innermost ring (see Figure 6.1 ), is the central
component that represents trust building. Throughout the planning process, building trust
is central to effectively achieving the plan and building the foundation of stronger
relationships that will continue to grow as the process is repeated.
1. Assertion: Located within the research phase, it is the medium between avoidance .
and aggression (see chapter 5 Conflict Resolution Continuum Model). It is the

starting point for determining the appropriate course of action to achieve resolution,
and therefore part of the discovery process.
2. Facilitation : This is located between the research phase and the common goals and

objectives phase. Facilitation during this initial stage in plan development helps to
identi fy common problems and interests between disputed groups. The Raider
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Competition and Collaboration Reframing model (see Chapter five, Figure 5 .2)

provides a framework for the communication process that can help to achieve
effective dialogue. This could prove to be the most influential component within the
process because it is at this stage that forms the foundation of effective
communication between groups.
4. Consensus Building: This tool is located between the common goals and objectives

phase and the plan formulation phase, where third party facilitation is critical. At this
point, the planning process begins to engage the larger public. This is the selling
point, a chance for the practitioner to convey the benefits of the plan. In addition, it
prepares the community for what lies ahead after the plan has been implemented.
This is the time for readdressing concerns and effectively restating compromises and
joint gains. The benefits at this stage are the most significant in the planning and
resolution process. The more consensus and general acceptance of the plan the less
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration are likely to take place once the plan is
implemented.
6. Negotiation & Mediation: This stage begins after the plan formulation and before

implementation of a formalized plan. This is the most sensitive phase in the planning
process because it is at this stage that behaviors are most likely to change as ideas are
challenged and decisions are made. Without negotiation or mediation,
communication can quickly become competitive and the entire process runs the risk
of failure. Planning professionals can act as facilitators to redirect and/or refocus the
direction of communication. (See Chapter 5, Figure 5.3).
7. Arbitration: This stage begins after the plan is implemented and before or during

the review and revise stage of the planning process. The amount of arbitration that
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talces place is determined by the general success of the plan. Arbitration is when third
party intervention is needed to settle disputes when both parties are in "deadlocked"
disagreement.
6. Evaluation: The evaluation stage is simultaneous with the review and revise
stage in the planning process. These tasks help to determine the strengths and
weaknesses of both the plan and the process. The purpose is to identify areas of
improvement that can be more closely monitored in the future.
Again, this model indicates how conflict resolution can be incorporated into the
planning process, and what objectives it serves in addressing planning related issues
while simultaneously bridging a relationship between groups who are formally opposed
to one another. In addition, it brings communities into the planning process where they
formally had very little or no input. Planners are able to address social concerns directly
and apply technical analysis, which further strengthens the legitimacy of the plan leaving
less room for criticism. Finally, planners will be able to move beyond marginalized
planning and talce educated risks with trust and support from their local community.
Planning with Conflict Resolution in Mind

It is I to assume that significant change can be achieved within a short period of
time. It is necessary to start small and build upon the foundation of successive
achievements. An inventory should be talcen of current conflict resolution initiatives and
forums talcing place. Suggested by the number of non-profit organizations working
within communities, the public is ready for a change in the unstable condition in which
they live. Cross-community initiatives have already been established to facilitate
dialogue between disputed groups. Following the format of Figure 6.1, there are
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planning initiatives that can be used to facilitate a shift in approaching conflict issues. To
begin, planners should survey organizations and individuals already engaged in the
resolution process to identify commonalities and societal goals, as well as members in the
public willing to participate in the process.
Once the planning process has begun, forums of communication should be opened
to representative members of the public. This can help identify common concerns and
non-traditional leaders to facilitate dialog among planning professional and their
communities. In addition, channels of communication should flow horizontally among
planning agencies to minimize disconnect between multiple projects. There are two
recommendations for achieving this goal. One recommendation is to create a unit within
each agency that participates in a larger unit responsible for communicating among
agencies and the public with a specialization in conflict resolution. The second
recommendation is to hold an annual conference for community development and
planning that is specifically designed to address Northern Ireland's situation. Planning
professionals, academia, politicians, community members, and other members of the
public would have the opportunity to engage in conversation and learn of current
initiatives and/or research to further promote planning with conflict resolution in mind.
Further action can be taken by selecting symbolic projects and incentives that
addresses common concerns and have beneficial outcomes for both the Catholic and
Protestant community. During open forums, participants can be encouraged to provide
input into possible alternatives, solutions, and incentives. While it may not be possible to
initiate every project or program, it would identify those that are appropriate for
immediate action and those that could be achieved over a long-term period. For example,
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eliminating a 'peace line' at an interface area that is relatively low risk to both
communities would have multiple benefits. It would create access between currently
restricted communities and public services, open the possibility for generating economic
activity in locations previously unfeasible, and symbolize to Belfast and Northern Ireland
that it is reaching an end to an era of divisiveness and conflict. Finally, shift
marginalization away from planning and redirect it to extremists. Strengthening the
collaborative voice of those in favor of resolving conflict will send a clear message to
extremists that destructive behaviors will no longer be tolerated. The only way Belfast
can succeed in marketing itself as the 'City of Culture' is by building a city and a nation
based on peaceful coexistence.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis is to gain a better perspective of the role urban planning
has in shifting from conflict management to conflict resolution. It does not presume to
prescribe a solution to conflict in totality. It does, however, describe why urban planning
agencies have a vested interest and significant influence in the process of conflict
resolution. The result of a violent history shared between Catholic and Protestant
ethnic/religious groups has deteriorated any trust between both communities and public
institutions. Many technical complications that urban planners face in Northern Ireland
are directly linked to strategies that attempt to cope with anthropocentric problems. As a
result, it is difficult to resolve issues critical to a successful planning process.
Northern Ireland practices planning under the same guidelines as those
established for all nations in the United Kingdom, and many planning policies are
established through one centralized government. What is good for one location may not
hold true for another due to varying circumstances. Therefore, planners in Northern
Ireland must move beyond traditional practice and seek innovative techniques to be
successful. Incorporating conflict resolution strategies into the planning process builds
relationships, and therefore opens the way to new planning opportunities.
Furthermore, for the planning process to be successful, change must occur in the
centralized organizational structure of planning agencies and in the planning process. At
this writing, the flow of information between planning agencies and the community is
highly restrictive. Community members are hesitant to establish any trustworthy
relationship if information is subjective to their needs. It is critical that information and
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communication flow in both directions. This can be accomplished through policies that
articulate a collective community voice. By empowering nontraditional community
leaders as facilitators between their community and planning agencies information can
flow horizontally back and forth between groups until all parties are satisfied with the
final results. Decentralizing the government's role in decision making will create a
positive step towards gaining public trust, which is at the core of conflict resolution.
As indicated through this research, the socio-economic dynamics of the
population most acutely affected by the confines of planning are those of low and
moderate income living in and around interface areas. These communities suffer higher
poverty levels, lower educational attainment, and poor housing. In addition, these
locations are divided by 'peace lines' designed to minimize conflict between opposing
communities. These physical barriers limit access to essential public services and
economic opportunities. Inter-community and cross-community programs have been
established to promote awareness and acceptance of both ethnic/religious groups. Some
organizations go so far as to resolve conflict between communities. These arenas have
made a substantial effort to bring conflict to an end, and the public seems generally
receptive to these efforts. Logically, planning agencies are well situated to establish
relationships within this arena to further promote community development while
concurrently expanding the capabilities of resolving conflict. A shift from technocratic
function in planning to a community consensus based approach would ultimately create a
shift from managing conflict to resolving it at a local level.
The most predominant and challenging planning strategy is the creation of 'peace
lines' (Murtagh, 1995), which have divided communities in the Belfast urban area in an
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attempt to minimize sectarian violence between Catholic and Protestant ethnic groups.
Ironically, this has the potential to be the most symbolic initiative to bridge successful
planning and conflict resolution. Targeting a 'peace line' as a community development
project could have profound implications no only for enhancing socio-economic
opportunities but also as an example that peaceful co-existence is possible.
Following the model in Figure 6.1 of .chapter six, a collaborative multi-agency
and community consensus based project could be established which would bring
everyone together in order to define the future of one interface area. Members of both
the Catholic and Protestant communities could define their joint needs and concerns
through negotiation and meditation, while members from a collective representation of
agencies could guide communication through their own areas of specialization. The end
product would be to create a collective co-existing community. During this process, new
innovative incentives for the interface community could be established as a reward of
accomplishment, as well as further community partnership and act as incentive for other
communities who want to participate. The process is designed to start locally and grow
nationally, and as it does the issue between national territorial ownership increasingly
becomes inconsequential because the residents associate themselves more within a co
existent community. Ideally, Northern Ireland becomes one independent and collective
nation based on internal resolution.
The city of Belfast has indicated that they wish to promote themselves as the 'City
of Culture'. It tried to do so in the past through redesigning its image, however plans did
not take into account social considerations, and any attempts to implement this vision
were criticized openly. Though, if Belfast was to incorporate an image based upon
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resolved differences it could be more freely accepted as a 'City of Culture'. This idea
could then be sold globally, and Northern Ireland could promote itself as an international
center for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. Belfast, instead of capitalizing on the
'terror tourist', could create an industry around peace building, functioning as model for
other contested communities in the world today and in the future. Revenue generated
from such activities could go towards funding for a local resolution incentives program,
therefore communities reap the benefits that they sow.
Further Research

This thesis has examined how conflict resolution strategies can be incorporated
into the planning process in Belfast in order to resolve problems associated with projects
that were previously design to manage conflict. . It has only examined problems
associated within the Belfast urban area, however conflict extends into rural areas of the
country as well. It would most certainly be more difficult to promote the same strategies
in such remote settings. An examination of how to incorporate or initiate a strategy for
conflict resolution in these areas would be beneficial for providing a nation-wide agenda.
This study provides only a brief summary of the socio-economic demographics of
Belfast's interface areas. Further study in the spatial distribution of ethnic population
could highlight areas of demographic change and the areas most in need of housing,
which is one of Belfast's most immediate concerns. In addition, indicators could be
appropriately identified or created to determine the most feasible 'peace line' removal
project to initiate. Such indicators could include but are not limited to per capita income,
educational attainment, household demographics (i.e. age, size, gender), ethnicity, crime,
and health.
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Finally, a financial feasibility study to determine the cost and benefits of
implementing a planning project proposed here would be advantageous. There have been
extensive studies on how 'conflict' has generated revenue in Belfast, and how the middle
and upper-middle income residents have benefited. The reality is that for resolution to
occur, the monetary benefits must be obvious, or those who benefit from conflict will
create rifts that hinder the overall success in any resolution-focused project. Meeting
these complex challenges and achieving a truly integrated society would provide a quality
of life that surpasses the expectations of the citizen's of Belfast.
Hypothetical Example

A hypothetical example of removing a 'peace line' illustrates the functionary
purpose of the model in Figure 6.1. A 'peace line' is a symbolic form in Northern Ireland
because it is a constant reminder of the conflict between the Catholic and Protestant
ethnic/religious groups. The Cluan Place 'peace line' in the Balleymacarrett community
has been chosen to be removed (See Figure 4.5).

It has

been chosen for several

significant reasons. First, it is one of the smallest in length and therefore economically
more feasible to remove. Second, it is located in a community that is 60% Protestant (see
Table 2.1), meaning that there are a significant number of Catholic residents already
integrated within the same community. Furthermore, there has a larger female population
within the community, and as stated earlier women are more open and accepting of the
opposite ethnic/religious group. Finally, as illustrated in the religious distribution map on
page xvii and in Figure 4.5, Balleymacarrett is located in close proximity to downtown,
and is visible location for a symbolic site for conflict resolution.
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In the first phase of this hypothetical planning and conflict resolution process
planners would identify inter and cross community groups as well as nontraditional
leaders who were willing to act as facilitators between their community and the planning
agencies. Next, planners would identify key support service providers within the area
that have a vested interest in the process. These providers would include but were not
limited to schools, public housing, waste management, fire and police. During this initial
research stage, an inventory of the community' s current conditions and socio-economic
structure would be conducted. This would be accomplished through voluntary action
groups, who were representatives of the community. This process is key to building trust
and expanding perceptions on issues. Participants would be chosen based on their degree
of knowledgeable about their own neighborhoods. Nontraditional community leaders
will seek information and in so doing will strengthen their relationship with neighbors.
The research by planners and the voluntary action groups would provide a
foundation to begin the process to identify common goals and objectives. The planning
agency would arrange for a series of charetts over several month starting first in
established segregated neighborhoods. The public was encouraged to attend the meetings
to discuss their needs and concerns. As neighborhood strengths and weaknesses are
discussed at the charetts, the facilitator will direct the discussion to similar discussions
recorded in other neighborhoods. Participants will be asked to identify common concerns
and goals. Eventually, groups of neighborhood representatives for each side of the barrier
will be asked to meeting to discuss their perspectives from their side of the barrier and
identify common issues of concern. The exercise would then be extended to compare
perspectives from either side of the barrier and define a set of goals.
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Lets assume that citizens ofBalleymacarett were able to identify three common
goals to be considered when removing the 'peace line'. First, improve the standard of
residential housing along Claun Place. Second, create opportunity for more commercial
development within the surrounding community. Finally, improve security within
Balleymacarett's residential areas.
With these goals and objectives in mind, through a second series of 'nested'
charetts, participants would be divided into diverse subgroups and given the task to
formulate alternatives to meet the assigned goal and objective. A planner would be
assigned to facilitate group discussion, to clarify jargon, keep the process on track, and
mitigate perceived differences of opinion. Lets also assume that the groups managed this
process well and were able to formulate a number of possible alternatives. Each group
had a chance to present their ideas to the rest of the participants, which were challenged
through a series of questions and comments. This then becomes a foundation to create a
cross-community association with local planning agencies to begin to set a specific
agenda to address common issues of concern and define steps to achieve common goals.
A key is to build the trust by taking viable steps that result in tangible results than can
symbolize the possibilities. If accomplished successfully than the 'peace line' can be
replaced by a vibrant commercial district or public park, which symbolizes the interaction
between both ethnic groups.
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Appendix
United Kingdom Public Records Office Release:
Public Records of 1972
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Public Records of 1972

"On 1 January 2003 the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew released a
number of government documents under the 'thirty year rule'. Some of
these documents were related to events in Northern Ireland during 1972.
The documents are listed in chronological order. "
"Following the introduction of Internment on 9 August 1971 there had
been a large increase in the level of violence in Northern Ireland. Violence
continued to increase during 1972 and by the end of the year almost 500
people had died making 1972 the worst year of the conflict. 1972 also saw
such events as: Bloody Sunday; the end of the Stormont government and
the introduction of Direct Rule; Bloody Friday; and Operation
Motorman."
(CAIN, 2003)
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ThiJe azgmnente.-JMI'.� � 1��--- (qj-;�j�ay; e.bd X i•� that �il'ii•tez■

wll1 �Obtinue to witli �.• f� •�f-;_�� �- maill,.-12'1$',"#;'�: �mont
ayatem U at all poaalble.,

taldni a
··"

n.ch(,

111 Jt po•�ble to do :..o· in •••entlal•, �lail.,

initiative ai the rJ.&l.lt �om•t?

tn thh. ��::i• :������iftJ,�, .M�,. :�ty ._,..,;

*'� (it•s•�> ��-

'2'KAllllJJY' •�-yo� (Mr. M�. ;�Ufi!•: �r �( -4th
tq the rc.,ot ol ttt♦

_,

�•;.,,• •••n �

.-u•t �. it •.,•.. that

,� - �•W;�!•-�:�:•:;.·: �•-�. .:\�:t _.p,,•._a�;�.- .c;-•�uc:
llell•""'
•••tu-�•• �.
•if".

popuktion Will he • f�e\bl.l(": ::· >/', ; ·,,-J{•�41'� � ,l'�Or.-.
·•.· • • •
Catholica -� 4o ;1"Qt
�l-• ,Ae �- uo de.fM-4 t._torms
111'Ul•. ton�.-. · ?(� p�ondu• c,i>
<.���f...·.<>f
.
# :tm•,, �;.o
dla
\ . t•i9f'.;m• ,.,,.it.ton:t�;,
li •nreJ.y
.
,. . . . acc��
. . .. ·.. -�
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. ., -� •, . , , .._ . . . ,.,
. , . ., ·· · ,
,. ·,
. .. id♦
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:·:::�-==:��:=;��1=·�
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......·on1y :way O! d.-monstr•U11& till• .wolild be• tf(� o! legislation at

W11•t1Pb\•�r . pqtffilJ .tit,-tt.d1J<tfe�i:.-..f th� authprl� d tlic United .Kingdom
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the

Par�:niat blf!Jwxl
e�&•�;.
tbe �Jnt� of tho logbla.Uont
t• cU.e�u:.11ton :_f;P•�· ♦f.(�)·t' anc1 a oq11!,tb ���:

-� : Commltt�

:�•ia••tetl that -� attempt to r�etrlbute ��nt•• ·facfl.- . ;�(�:
traufer r.e liponail>W.ty for . law and order to W••tmbllte� would\"w ,�•
to lo&'lti> Stormont •o .� ..J �•��e pow�r •� �l.l..it

y

�. V•��i� Ci<)ver$�Jit

�: met>*

'U..1

��ttau ·.a¥··!'f1 •��-� ��:·..

pr�'Cl�t,n� tbe .ttuatirn,

wh\ch·w.,.-••-•>�

0 � ��
-..�
\

Bllt ._. th• now m•���:-en• '�,g:�-�o-1 -��vie•� 'tp �otec�1'�!..
altetnatb1e appr�h
l*�-- --�·,20••lble
Minority" (OEN •t(tl),, ,tt�U,1.
. ,
'
, · , ; "/:_ . , . , - .... .. . .-·-•: ··, ···.
i . . .,,..: :. .
-

.

.. - - -

1.. e. lop■Jatioa .at Weatmmat r a�rameamg to tho Catholic �ority
.a:.. z.,aaom\ble ehar.e in l"cprH�•t1on not �y bi :�_Ul,t"P,@t,.:�t . i.a -tJi•

���-- -a.m,f -�Ol"P•��I: ��,g cl�Jij'tl,• • to, -...t its �--··

&om beina t'.r,utratt' _.,llijt �j,r'�. lt. 1�/��,--#,::c•c�'/�(•1.U:&
'l•_··N-t
.,'.����:�;_. �the
· •latiOA'•
. · : O\'ls� aaf�,;.��
. ,Jw.hu.. tur-:
.
· ..
---,,
---a . . · , . · ' : �� !"";r,, P.' ' ; • . . .. . .. ��-:-•
�lty ••atnet 'tadmbdstra.ttve�• dlio��tt<>n<o�'.. I�' /b,.J':.F:•qilbltlf·
.

·:

;tWtt

a. cer1-"1 n�r of- po•ta -on �le �l#llOl'i� ;��{be i�lld: �

ca�Jic:• and �� �' .�:-� ' ��-•�•• · ,AAd - tbe law W�·: Jieed

jt •:JW••¢1'1�

wrr· -.�i:N�·

J@� '�"·i�.,. �ea�1a � •��•

,j�'.�t•.
s�
A •t•tem :or this· kind wowd tn.volvt·'.•ome

a�cstn �

authority ()(. tho Oovor:llfflOZlt al.St.monh ani; l(wo-cil;� c��o,�•
�,-��
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to a4opt ..le.-. �'ti.al•· �; we- �••�-,e•:,a,e :p,ro�--• toJ-.v.e • ncou.-•.•:
·
i�: tbb 1dlld oC ·aotud� - �♦•la; ancl � �torrn,ont ayt;tem �-->•�h could
et Uhoiitm••• - u �t '°•,i'1•• therefo:re, ._t, if th• ', Qo�at •atd
.
p,iblicly that ·mi.rmnetat · � ac,t:_.. ed.ed •o tong .a.e 'Violence :per•i■ted but
·
that. · lt' v.toleace c:ea■ed;. they � be.·:PH"'red,io c_.:w.. ��
intft'llffleiat •.i •eo. 1,e•i.�:--. ·a.e ,a� UM••·
�-·•m11•
be
Mr. �,.....�,: .�•• IIXtl'',�; -��
.
to. accQt �· 4 • .
iwrdmt :�-� lt �\ ,oE

•u.ft',lc��,''.�� �, �.,,
•• ct"� ·

��a_w

ot•··

♦

coar� * · ._,.:.:;r�s,�
,� a=�· �;� � �;: •�.�:ll�t
·

Wms;· ,but , ·,U it w•'• Ort . ��. ot PJ••�r�,a -�- .;�ui. :��int:-4
·
· . •of
aQme c. . .. ·d
· ·
. �
\, - · ••
i ,. ., ·. ,,:. >'.,
. .....
. a
. �a pri�" "'�tlf.'.�. Ii �.�-�t
1\0; t.,� ,- ���- �: �tl<t.� , :
ln· th•·'...��)#� �n- �'.pr��-� �r��� �.•·� '.'::
•uatUoo• .,� o�,...•.', �t.,lt would ·'-
6.. . If th�• . i,
J
.oi-tl(:4w�o���.�?!�--•��n:la �N:.;�1)':�������.� c1raruns
a llW)(wldch··# ·o"bec:•ettheiJ••d• £>•� :� .��-·.them) imt by
pro4Q�fua �o � p;opo.al• �r �tel'• to:�:u�' ¥�e,uy
di-aftiaa oi l•�lWO! 1!4'P! hl · �,. � tho proj�ct .'�"1, OCl turihff
.
e�mfniid§t to be ·�th��I ff � ·�,t�ef�,,. 9U'f ' lo CO,Wicier
.
how .nd when to J.auch' lt . .-,1 bow to obtain f<W it tho JWLXtnutrn �r •-..pport,
in.the South no l�1• :t1uu.1 in the NOl"tb.
.
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For the �••t, . lt ••
by Mr. llolwbl �c.).ej--C�k .:.t a.
·
!
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Thia tho\lld ��: JHt' 'r,;r.newed ac' a.nd enforced?

ni. Hlatlvely,ta�ntlo

bandling ot the · a;ntf...,intff� maroh: .on ·Chl-1-bna• -D•yr11PA•· p-,1'•P•
to " cc�••d ·by the -�e{�::� �o�c••d.o-..

B�. >if: � �� fd�I o.

�6' � Mi-. ����••f:�Yl:�, we c��t:�� -�·-�•�· �m

-b4�it.Jy,;· t�f:i,J"5���,u. ta.Hie, ij,: ...J;g}� skw•• to deal with

:�•·t,.__t..Vthr�..u;,��-· t)io

pz�c•,�; � lnttnudatton•
.. .
·
l'lnglta4et• of ••h ��h•� • �· � 'to .� . pr°'ec�, .i9{,,#if - �,,

:of41tlJ.j. · (la � ���-;. the &•�•-' :��'� ·�·

. &,� -,��..,,.

�,.-�iiia����:

�;.��i'.e�� :���,: :��:, «>��:et, • �.a.ft.�� -to cle�l

: �.:���;'�Xl¥�..-:�)�:-�'.����
f
,80lcUer•
U;,
· · . •. •houJ.••��'
·• . : ·., <tx>•. /·::-

••·\t�•.� :�G::. ,
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•-tt•UOG:""
.
· .· ·· · · · .· :toi:,la · · :' :' "
· · '. ·
c,�·.ouun
. · . .• .u.. .� ...tor<'��•-•.
... .. · . • ��· ,., ��-� �
·'
ijle.ts:' �u•tocty -��•�t':�i&iic�,ili�:�18:��::•� •:.·;i ·•. ._· •- �•
J()j,

)· ·
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$uw-1:� neri
1 .
Ar < · · ,y:, : ' ·

✓•
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'·:

• :'' , ••.- ,. ' •

t( •eareptla•\� ·•�� &m:g�otta �! �nftbe le.e ?
(b) . Cut.,u�emen,tll be maute .for �e

•

•

•��bf:llta#�� •ot;tho inter�ceQ ?

l wide.r•tahd that Ge.neral Fcttd _pat .tbe PQbat � � 4� ,:�. .�:,�
?
&j
Belwt befo-re CIU' Je't:cnae. :(But �t �ocut lfr�b��*' tn... '
♦h,"t. t() _pa:y f�tAtJ. ·
(o)

Hp�fdij1� •tan4 OJ;1 �;ove�nt. 1D t1;re lnt.6,�t poc�e/l

The No.rthern lreland �rnm•t have �.r11.um&r oH_wopoealuajdv

c�•;deratiPD, h,cl. the auQ••t1on;:�(tJuv�p,-J.1t t#bunal ahould

ngt:. only b1t. �4td,i�:t� � ·. �·"' �::�dual• aljpay, ;��et.t•· �

-•� a.t.•().iba.t� s,. tone �� m,:ouabt ,��;�:��{� �I'�: that
'.

·int•�nt ordv• •J!i9'1� �, mad• u a z<,s\;llt of lts :r-ec ommendatlon•
z:a;� than timply oo �• rcco minenda:tfon of tho RUC .

W•::8"lher that

thia, particular pr.o
po sal (wbl<:b orlginattuJ with the. Attorney •�.t, ot
Nortk•�n'. k,.lan4. but •�• die lMd.>.efit O, 9��t1<>'A 'Wltl( hi�i

�ESE��r�ii:F:i�

==�=::,�:-: ::�r�:���;
(cl) ' 1t we can t1c;eure a lull ln 'J�o.'� ,.���• lt w9UW pto1-bly

«

the �.�:�J;:\�y. ,B\lt I.ti• ��:-�J: th• le•• �;�ll!;��p.t '.-�
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� �ed ...n hi •av�e mp.-.._ ,��; -"���·- •t�!•!�
ac)i;; cu. be taken ciw.ckly. · Tilt. thi• la,wldl·:� "••ar.e•�•,r,:_ � at.
<•> alM>vo.
(•) SlJ' �ip; �; wUl �• •W• �:--�i , • tii• ��QQ:Pf
$h-_ ��- �- �-- ��- •�: �t .,,.i,::,Af>t_.� .itt, :�. �
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TOP SECRET
!}
Cepy .Np.
CABINET
CONFD>ENTIAL ANNEX
CM(?2) 5th Conclualcma1 Mbwte 3
Tlmr eday 3 .l'emrauy 1972 at U. 30 am

THE SECRE TARY OF STA TE FOR. DEFJJNCil ,aa:14 that tho Army
welcomed the Inquiry wb!ch the Lord 'Ch1e£ Jutico •fli,f ...paad.
Lord Wldsery, had
to undertake und.er the '1)db.-nal■ of
Inquiry (Evidence ) Act 1921 Into the cventa fu l.rmcl••# on
Suada.y 30 January. Jt waa to bo fea..-ed that ...toua• at.01'der••
with a z-Sak ol a "1rther loH ol llf•• mta'ht Z"otNlt bom th• marche•
pl.aimed to;tab place ln .nd. around Newry OD Suactay 6 Febl"uu,y.
Condnpllte fron) l)uadalk, which lay close auo••· the Border, wea-e
!mend� to take part. The dl•po•ltloae •• by � aeevtty fOl'cea
mvolved ln thl• case the Royal Ulster Coauda� .(Aue). whom it
had been impracticable to deploy 1n tble·--way · ln Lon.donrleny; the _
Ar--, would be �ept In roa01'Vo to covor polnte whkh tb.e RUC might
not be able to hold.

•sr•ed

THE PRIME laNJSTER, •urmni.n8 up a brief dl..-:uaalon, •aid that
there mlght be advantago in en•a.1'1ng tbat it waa more 'Wic:wly Jmown
that. aa tbe Lord Cbancellor had alroacty lfl!ormed tbl Hoaae of
Lords, it ha4 been Lord \7klgery' • own propj!Hal that he •hould
concJu.ct the JaquJl"y alone. "1'11ia mi.pt bolp to foreatall any
that the Government had appointed a slngte lndlvldnl
1n ordo:r to avoid. t:he poaelblllty of a dlv•pnce of 91ew. 1w:h as
had aria.en 'between Lord Parker an4 Mr 1<>hn Boy,1...Carpent• MP
on the OQ.6 bud and Lord Ge.rdfDer on the other ·hand durlag their
ecent luqalry !nU\ the procedur,oa a�S ln�ogadon.
Lord Wldgery
that - Id.a· own .l'nqmry waa elmp1y 1nto queetfone
of factf ttaat he would be able to :forin an opfAton by quadomns eye
witneHea wlthollt tbe need for expert • other aaelataJil:;e; and tba,t
he could coaclade the Jaquiry more q� If he conducted it •Jc:rn..
The Roman CatboUc, resident. of Lonclondnr,, might not be prepUed
to co-opuate wfth h1m. But he would 1-v• p(M'Gr to emn:moD
wit:ne ..ea sub poeu.; · and it could not bo �•YIM..,,. ara-d
that' the Lord Chief J'utice o£ Englazlcl �. Impartiality. As
to the march•• plumed hi am a.road Newry, it wae desirable that
e.ery · tnODfltftce should be brollsht to � to pr�t their ta1dna
place. He had. hlm8Glt' written to the B.oman Catholic Arcbbl•hop

••sa••tlon

Jltdpd

l
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of Woatmlnatu and to the Roman CatbOllc l>l-imate of All lrelui4J
and HM Aml>aJIIAdor 1D hblln
do8".rln& a par ■onal meaaa.p
to the Prime Mmleter of tbe lriah R•publtc� Mr l.,ynch, aaldn.s hlm
i:A ��ular to cltanacte cW.eu ot tbe l\opublic from lllda&.. i,arl.

was

Tho Ca'bbutt •
I.
Took note. with approval. of tho Pr� Mmlatu 1 a
,u.,...na •., of dda part of ..� dlKiaHloa..

THE PRU,4E .MINISTER •a.Id that the Northern Irolaud Prime Mlatlitu2',
Mr Faulkiaer, had been lnvlted to London to cllecues tho polltlc:d
altua.tkm. on the follow.:l.ng day. Thezie wero reporte that Afr. .1'rnch
and · tba leadeH of tho Fino Go.el and l.o..bo• Partio• la the B.Qm>lk ·
might &leo � to come to LondQQ to _,.et; British Mml9tere. It
•w.:b a requ.•� wa• ll'ii&cl• &Del c:c>llld bt d..med to be for tbe pu-POfe:
o£ •erloas dlecu.etiloh r•ther tbzt.n. miere propagaJlda. 1, wouJ.4 be, unwlile
to refuae. Jt .,.. de•S.•ble to lowor th• polWcal tension m the
Republic� U po.. l'bla, putloQ].u-ly ht view of Mr Lpch1• precarl.cu
poakion and the abaen.ce of any n.cceHor who could exert - a
mod•ating influence.
The 9ltu.tlon was being kept under c�
review by tho .Mtnieten principally Ctc)11Corned; ill particular poHible
fot"ma of p()litlcal lnlUative \Ml'• bebif ouelwly appraised.
In dtacuae1ora ther e was g;en.eral •Fccment on the J.mporumce of ..
maintaming e. broad base· al auppo1!'t la Great Britain fo.r the
pub1fc opiD1oo w:bhoo
Oowi-auneat.t1a pollcy. A growlng He.tloa
to •" British troop• wlthdra'W'D from Northern J:reland. lt wn•
aomottmee fol"aotten. howevu , that the Anny was the Armi.r �J
the United 10.naaom and waa not opej&tfas In a. foreign or colonlal
territory. MorctOYOJ'• to tbroaten �awal mlsht cz-eate a,n
expec.� that th� Goverm:noat1• t:"oeoludon wa• w-oakonlua» whUe
to cury ft • c:Ollld �y renlt In extensive bloodahed m Northern
Ireland, In wblc·h iw· Romu1 Catholic clement o£ the popaladGri inlpt
well be the ma:.tn .a"uera. Be!oro the Ar"iffy aarrison could be
reduc� to a •lam£1cantly lower 1avel an acceptable •tate ol. l&w and
order would have to be reetored and a eatlafactory polJUcal ,... ..
ment woul4 need • be a�'bleved. �thele.H, in order to i-,tain
a t.oa.d m,oa. aure of puJ,1tc --.port lor tho mamMmaneo of luge
snWtary l-.c•- 111 Northern lrelanct. it •• de•lrable that movement
toward• some politlcal •<tlution of the conllict •hould be Meil to be .In
�o•pec:t. It was auo probeble that t:bere would be increutna
lntorudono.1 preeaare In favo• of a Polidc;al lnUiatlve.
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Ipoidenta cl;rg;1ng the paat 24; hours
t�,t activity· VBS at a COJDpt.N..tivei, hJ8h l�l throughOUt
IlU.. &PPlU'Oll
the �(:e vith a concori.ed b<>mbin&
. · . o,mpaign by. 'the
.• . .tly
. '
4eaipe4 to 1apNQ8 on the Catholic · po�•,10� their ct ·,tentma tion
to con'itnu .. the c� ot :rl.,olel)Oe .

't)lero was • iota.J. r>f 24

bomb •x»�oa1ona• end a further five boaba .-wore ctehaH by Amy
41#,po,-:;t eSp1rts .
2.

18 ot �• ��b •xploalone were 1n the ru.ral. a.r•·as.

!hey

�ol�e4 �
. bo.b at'tack on the Coun.ou OttJ.ce <at lfewry , where a
ett�1 t1

..-n

vu $b9't · Ui tb.• leg•; an expioaion i» a · derelict

house near Q��. in -�bioh thl'De aoldie:ra � alightly
inj1J%'ed; an attack OD eletricity pyl.one· near C'ro�� and an
add.itiou :tQtW p·the,r bomba vere 4ef'uaed b7 Art'JJ:1: boab c1.1oposal experts .
,.

there were three exp1o·e1oms in Belts.et.

'!he Stnith1'1eld Bue

station was :ext••�� �cl by a 50 - 100 lb bomb ; a car hire
fira 1n Groe:veno� Road vaa al.110 ee:riouel.1 damagod by Jl 100 lb bomb;
e4 ,a 15.: ll> bOJD.b e,aµa d a:r1nor �e to the Be�,m Hote l , Dunrl'nirey
A' malio1otaa �ire at tho tln1'Vtre1ty Air S� �114Ung in hl.!ast
cau.ae4 four cbilian casualties . a !bla1lb b011b � �· a c:ar in
Qoi,,·ora"if>n. s,reet , was d,eal:t with by a. traine4 a�41er fir� -a

�arl

Churttav ,anti,-tant. rocket vi.th an inert warhead e.t the � und•r

th-, SU:t>O"tf1pn. .o:t a b.cmb' 4.iepoN.l. expert.:

th& first ope�:tioJJtd

u,,e ot tbia tecJ:m44,ue ancLa .o�a,1d.era.ble aue:ce• •

Onl1' ten .»- ·Qi,nt

of the ·5()" l'b �88 ap].QtJed, . 9auaing very little · 4amage , theother 90 pe� ca,it. being &CIJ.tt�ff harmleasl.y .
4.

�ere . wero · three dploeiona in Lo.ll.4Qtlderry , �ough no casualti ct

..

�etatGcl•
·5 .

!her• ·were 14. ao�,1ng incidents in the Province .

It •

- - � • ,-,.it.,.��::

In, Boltast
/t.roope
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r�·�t��EO

·-

_,,_ ; �d:Y,��

t.roopa were fired on three tillee , retuned fire once an.cl opened. tin
on a 6\,UJmaI1 once.

li1 one of the inc id.en ts, a soldier vae -�111h�1:

:lnjued. In Londonderry thffe vero a1�· ahoottng tncidenta at the
aeourity
�orc:ee..
II

Ptw was returned
twice
and it is believed that.
•
,
·." ·

one gunman was �t .
areas .

h'oope

W'•r,

Th•r• •�e tour 8hot>tfll& ia0:1dfflts 1D the

f\1%'8.l.

ft� oa . ,hree tiua, OJ1ce �m aci-oaa '"1•

99--• hnaanash,. ln. the 1<aurth '1no1d.ent · an
·tµ-e« on uev -Rewtomhallil:ton but was not injured.

border near 0-affiaiozi.
ex-B

s"o1al

6.

othei-- 1Do1dmta in. the Province tnclmed :a peaoetu.l cletao;n.at�-,

was

tion in Belf'ast l>y 500 bot�atant
the releaa. ot tntemee•.

W<NI._ outside 9·r,.uidil,\ Gao1 -�

rw:o wanted arr�ate Velie ma.de tn:- �faet .

There vae the � llooltsan :actlyi\f' 1b l>oth l3eltut and t n

ve.as.
Joumalista at th, �pa Jfo�-1, :�-t; hav·• befn told that
. �

The" were three a�cl
?.

at tvel.ve o • clock
llad.e.
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RJC0RD. OF. A .?BI.m'HCflE. 00
.·
AT.ION ....
. . .· ·. · · :��· · PltllS .NINISTBR CP· tfammRN IBKlitOO). AHO·. ; mB PRIME MINIffl!R
AT 4.15 : p�m. 00 WBDNESDAY 15 �·1-w2 ,
.
NVBRS
.·· ·
·· .
.

Greetings exobanged.
I!Jl.... Tne situatf'on is toot we be.ve now Naehed ·the
stage wt1ere • �ve carefully cQ0$1� everyth.tng
yc-.., nave said to us aJXI • nave done . a oaplate review
.af: our own .PQS1tion and now we 'WQuld 11� to .go _over
it all with you �n. And what I was 110�erif4l was
wnetner )tOu ·:oould come ove.r here -on W� :next week
wtncb �d �ve .us a onance ,t(r:g,t, 9ur �et QUt at
the way.. 'ftlen we could spend a � o.r as much ot tne
� .u 10\l ¢an spa.re gQ1Q8 over uie tmc:tle gtteurxt. t
don't know whether that ·would fit in witb your plaas.
IC, lt Yes 1t would perteQtlY. It v.ould help me a lot
- I don 't know wtlettler 1t is. possible - if you can g�ve
me aoyt.t11ng 1n wr1Ung btfo.re that so that I can prepare
tor YIJat l am going to \al� about.
l:!.L. Well, we did oonsid&.r that. bee� 01' .tbs nQt,e
111 your own l$tt,er to me . Am we .realty telt that i.noJ-8
was so much 1'.ran the point of view ot; tbe general P'->ir:rLs
tm,lt 1s .i-eallY very dJ.tt1°'}lt to put gown o.n a ,P1eoe
Of paper.
ll!a Jr. I l.@eratam U.'t.

E.L.. And the other thing is lWhetnar". again in view ot
�t tau. sa;id 10 your last few wQl'(la, lVbetner vou- ,t�
llke to bring one or two people witn ,oo.

J,W, le I wOU.ld 11.ke to tbiuk abou't tbat,. Would _ yc,u
actually WNtt to come to (l,8:Q1�J,,..uns that- µav :ror
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immediate announce.ment?
.fal.. Vlell . I alwars said tbat we would have 00Mult.at1ons
with you beto.tte we timlly set-t�l+;Kl anvthing
meot .

So l

gr-ou.nd ' •
whether
o.r

not..

was �· this

tor

announ.ce

as a good • going ovei- the

It rat.her depe�s on where we get. to as to

there -.are. dec1s1oos tor announcement

1-d$atel¥

Mc,

Fe Well, you see , provided that we weM not actuall.v
goiag to reach t.tm oonolusiona and anoOWleing toot d¥�.

·

I wou.ld not be � oonoernod. .e1�tier about having aQlttlilng
1n adv4noe •O� about briaging anyone Viith me.

l!.JI..

It 1s .r�l:i, Just a . .�est1Qn as 'tQ wbathe.r- you

ttliilk it wwld be helpful tor

you

and

ror

'them, as I

shall nave tne nDl'f�l colleagues with ma .

14£, la It migltt well be , but I would l1k& to think
about -�t.;
.f.dia.. Well, Will 9011 turn 1t over.

am

tben . fW can let

me know.
Kr,

E,

Risht.

E.Ji.. But they would b8 very welcome • 1t you would like t-o.
Mr,

F.

Right .

l!J4a.. Tben I tJ:w'lk pe.rhaps

i wrulc;

like to say taaor,n,w

mo.r� at our usual time tbat vou wJ.1,1 be com1ag.
Mr, F, Yes . tin you announce that I am c�. how
would you r,llrase t,nat - fC1I! :cotlSllltations?
l!J4a.. That ls rigbt.

Well, we w111 go ahead on that .basis .
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0A the iawtructiona ot th• Secretary or 8j:ate l ut :representati"8
of tli4I . ProvloioDAl IRA .at 3 pm on �•uiclay, 20 J'un.e. fh.e •etlftl
took place at Ball.yanett:, a · h01.11Je near tbe Dono.pl bordft' Olffl8Cl
bf Colonel M �. JlcCortell . the Colonel ancl. Hrs McCcrk•ll ...,... 1D
the houa• at the UH.
2. . :,._ .:llA- ·�._._.._iiJMD � DaY.1.« <>•0�1:a. . ,.a
b ,�., -., l: •.., ..�.:� )y Jii Pnak ·:11·1�.

ii'

,,� . letoro � Uucni1u.d.. ou proper started l waa intro4iAco«l to
,,•· third perion, Mr P J >tGCror1 who . "8a cles�bed u a solicitor
an4 a whollf i l,4epeadent person . It bad ·bffn � t'b,at 1
sboul4 �arr,- 111th • a note aicned by the Secrotary ot · Stt.t• to
oaY that I wzu, an nuthoriaed :ropro11ontative . Thia note ie in tbe
tollcnr1ng teraa:

:tr,••,._·t11.ne

"The. boat"ff· ·or th£!, note , Mr •p. :1. •�.i«t � a
aeiar official. in .,- Department.
fDU
.,..,.t•
authority to . explain my position 011'which ban bNA.. put to •••
Be \& Millt:, �M lfr· ttr st..1e, another ottioial
tu. 117 �. ·
(a�) Vlll!ea Vhi telaw
hcn-- <if 8t..i•
tor fort� bvlu4•
•r llcGNrl7' • NDctioo appeared . to be lo ■crutinioe this . . Dot. ad.
·l>)- �. ot hi• legal pm,ua 1- pl"OllO'Wlftll ii au...tto ..._ t'h•
wltJadl,ew.

.4i .......

4.
Ve lepa
tJltlt. • •i:a�f •hoa . ate "1t11Jt� fll•
poaitton . ·ot tM· Proflnou.1 ·m . u ·� to the hmttar., ot.
.
St'ate wldc)a WM M fol]JMU
� IRA 'ltff& i>repnrod to call an indefinite -e&ase tire
tt they coUld be atistled that tho Secreta?J or State
11oulcl e.cc�t tbo dmumcl of ce:rt-t1.in. conv icted M"iOOftON
tor "poliUcal atatua• a that he would iuodiately' order
the ceos-ation ot aU. ·� ot th♦ IDj aucl th&'t
bl would bf> pr�p� attu the .--.·. tire hacl ·� ebovn
to lie ot:reoUn to � Nprea._.ti.,._ or the Proviaional
Jill.

fOP $Dlf
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5.
They did not 41not� -challenge the •CC\U"&CY of thia aa
.thctir position. · � �o the apaoltio mttna which tbar
.
,raie: d I Nii that the 8NrOtary' of State coultl a()i · .�
tbo demand. �or political. .tat. f"or convteto4 priaonora.
Quito apuot frta. ao.r oth41- con.a idor: ti,ou. thia voa not •
concept JmovD to ·the lav and tho Sectetat,'� ot State could.
tharef'Ol'e \ DOt $ive etteot to it .. H• vu hOlife'ffr preptwod. to
c�ider reprao♦ntationa troa; lffl:I'. quarter about apecUic
· tt;on atrecting the tTM:hent ot priaonors and had 1n taot
a1.Na41 111de cert,a in a1'1'1UJBementa vhi� WIINi aut,tieiently
'satiatac t ory to tbe priaone:n th
fj� tho.a to have
call.a otf their huna� •tl."ike ff ..a been. ann.Olmoed on -ti.
nen. I auggeated that th$ nbatanc:e ot what vu bct ➔.ng asked.
tor '11114er. thjJ! bead. vae Yirtw.slq tho 'poaition u it now waa ..

•'l•••

6.
llr 0 ' Co�ll 'n14 that ho 'bro«41:, accepted thia , but
there na a
doubt •• to Whether the npo:rt that- th., h�
atri.ke had been called ott ,... -true . Be ukad il l wou1d at
once telephone the OO'femor ot B ltPt Prison and ulc tor a
naae4 pria0t1tt to CO'llle to the: telephone to pv• a penooal
� to Mr o• c�ell on eetber or not tha hunpr strike
hit4 � callod. of�.

7.
I poiatel out thd it ha4. )MNrA � that Otll' •wt!ll&'
ahCNl.4 be ecmpl•t•l.1' aoctret -4 •t ror • to do what lie
aake4 w�4 ,oalllle · «ii · ' ediato lak and that thero vu no
prospect tat. · lie' : vould be able to pt . th• Oovemor to lsrJ.Qg
the pt'J.■Ollff to the telephon to t&lk to Kr O • Connell-.

8.
I then tuiu4 to the eecOQd qll♦ot1• . Vhich had bee
put - :Lt' a ceaae flro vo:tte -�ed •<,alt 11m 8QOHtary of Stata
atop the ban.a••'\ or the �OD&l DA. I uicl '11,at
hara&811leJ;l\ -.. • "nBUO t�m · and aeant dttf'erent thinp to
W'f� JGQ�. Ht.or �1• ot "ffflOI\S example• I
aaid. that 1t
that lthat tbe W1.> :roprc3ontat1voa WN
Alking ro� DJJ an a saurqcG that: th� aecurity torc_s vould
not tak• the opportunity . of a cease fire 'ti 1)1Ck up aea llb.c,
they had been lDl&ble to get ell• the cam,-ip •• on. 'lh"I'
aereed tlult tbh' •- · their p0ait1on u4 I oti.id tbat . tbe
Secretary of' Sta,te vaa pl'oparod to gt.w an 3,asurn.1u:,o on this
and a?'Nsta _\o
p,oin't 1mi�h would man that raid • sea:rcb
look for p�ple wanted for their past activl tiu would not
take place., '?hey raised one o\i.'boidiar, point : -- --�
ot thou- organ.1sat1cn remtn-4 1n tear or. beinfr a,tao1cea
ha4 been a.ecun tomc4 to cU'J.'y'ing concealed ri.de•e.rllils. It 'tb•
� atopped an4 to-4 te>_ be CV17in& um voul4 .,,., •
urested? -1 _,...� -.t tb1a 1ftUl a quet1ti® w.lticb I wo.al.cl �•
l>aek wt �- -• .obJao• .... to produce a aituat:lon
.MOB •
p03aible vh• people llO lOllpr thau«ht tbey n-4,ed to .oarr,
f irearu eml tl»Jti it penoM nre goi111 about an noralil.
peaceM INS1D"8
aot be· · 1nal>3ect to ar\itNJ7
ot,opp1ng ancl HU'cb1q-40

•••e4
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9.
the third question which had -�• ,at . ,,... vheth«r ._.
Soorot&r., of State vouU e,ree to a � -.tua ·. td.till
repreaentaH:Tee attel" tho c:,ea.ae fiN • On tbie J aa14 tbat
the ananJ:" WM 1eo but tb&t the Secret&?)' or State mat
i'!Nlt 'be a&t:t:afiell that �e oeaae tire was ettocUn and
that ho IIUBt be the 3Ud.se 011 ih.18 que11ti.on. Tlley accepted
this u4 there vu· tboa a goo.cl deal o� baulls,i about -
t$,il1t tb&t a genuine cease tire woul4 have to 1�at before
the meeting took place.- Enntually wo satt1ed. -on ten dqa ,
t he � trhi�h th• Secretary of State ha4 authorised M
to �• to. 1
that tld.11 pvicd ot ten days would n..«
to 1nc;lud.e two v, ek. Uda but l c11cl not uke it o.n abaolute
co:nditim.

Nia

10 . I ha4 pr"1�)1 anmsaecl with Jlr Steele that at�
these opening uohan,pa • voul4 'bri:nc � oiaowsaiou in.to
the tom ot a llOl'llll converQation Jlitb the o'bJect ot dravfq
out; tho IRA ropneentatiYM and lelptns eacboth r out it Ut•
diacwsat.ou reachej nkvard. comen . At this point tbo IRA
i-e�aqtativea began to ra110 a n•b r or other .aa.t'tue na
tbo •�• becs.119 aoro Worul u Planned . On each of
tho points. rai sed amt n.coraod ·below ve oxpla.inod the pu.bUcltl)T
stated position ot BKG wlloff relevant , e=phaaiaod that ve bacl
no auth01"1 t,y � ..-go'1ate, add we would accurately report
thou- point• to S of S, ln�t ·that none of thara could be o.dditlonal
conditiono .for .· a CMM ti re . All thin thq said tbeJ" undo.-etoocl
and, accepted.
11 . 1'h.e7 ask.od whether :._ e.aao :ru-e voulcl be tollowcl ra:picl17
by the vithdrawu or the · 1nsy tr• Oatnoli� ano., part:1 ,:t.alAd.y
in J1eltut, and whether t�ir . 'pcltr<>lling oould be ·Confined to
in .
Wa nplied tba't ti\4) British A:ztmT ie not d.oployed.
- on ·the etreets ot the ciUoa ot Northom Irelud becauao this
was vh re ·t'.he Brittah OCNornmont wanted thett1 to be. Tho
object VAB a ceaaation or violence and intercomunal . �oe
lUld it tba t nre achined there wtJl4 l» no need . r., •
penatmont J.:n:t p:rea co . 'rhe, did not dieaent tr•· t.ili■
said that if there could be a rapid :reduction !Ja · J.iV' aottn.v
this would brin div1.dcmd4 ud. voula oNRte a ·ntt. ataoepbeN.

road•.

-.t ,

12. !he next: mtttter raiaa4 waa a roqueat tar the e&l"ly' releaae
f'r= prisofl ot' one FO&l'd.neDt Catholic ( ·l clCee who 1
th · Boltut
Prl.spn huns•r a trike) aDd. one or postll by -two Protaatan:t,.. fha,
aaid tbat all tbNo ot these penon.s had 'been trAmed. Ve said
that tbe ;J'equest ro%' .any re-.ui,r ot •011tence on tho t:rouncla ot
aii,carr-iage of jwatice woi;llcl b conv&fed to tho Secretary of'
St te but that these c(>Uld. not
utters for bagaining nor
an.ea in 1m.ich ttnY· early- dec.i atcm coald be expected.
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1, . '1he nu. a-. aoa« u �u lfo� l:ielaa4 Office w"-14
a prepared to .uait their good _ ottloee �- ���o• tbea to
npreaentatiwaot tho ·UDA . 'rhq cllt arly noogniaod the 1JDA
u • potetat1all7 4e:n,o'... _power centre irl lfortbe:rn InlaQil
-4 implied that 11 a meoUii.r could bo effected the7 Jdtl,\t
pt along better tbmt.- · a_ome pe ople WO\llcl expect .
u. Ve en our •1cle ra1aoa· a _..bor of points 4H1&n04 to
enallN that # • ceue tua .. 4e:olare4 it aho\1l4 be
etteo\:i:n . Pint •• tol4 them not to ha u:, 1-edkte
an4 trrevo<;a'blo concluaione . h<m_ miJ' action bJ the.
:force llh1ch appeared. to tha to -... contrar, t· <J the Sepre�
ot Sta:t• ' a uaura.ncu. 11' the:, th.empt they are ·bcd-.r _
_·
triokn ·they BhO\lld maket s-e41ate ocmtact •itb the I�._.
lrel..dd Oti'ice and J)Ut their crtrn.noes cmd •att for Otn
reaponao .. It the:, :reaaine4, cli,aaliaf-•4 thn would\ h.,..
,draw. tor -thelllBelvea tlm oo.eqmncea· • �enb,g io
actiri ty but it the.y , ..,_.. fibc.-. ·.· in ·tl\eiJ.;o desire �- a
ceaa.e fiN _·an4 u ed � .toi�t. · they ah-1:Rild · 1n,t.· a«1cemed.
to eiuru.n that it dt,d not ,tart -:qa1n by a msund.eatancli»«..
!hoy wlcoaed thie ancl .. � �� line of c,cmtact ( 1.hrougb.
the - �orm,,,r ottice, ot the lJK. lbr�aentative) vcu1 arranpct.
ftey va, • to mlY
tb&7 would ·velcO\\!le local :,OSllb · of
contact -� thety f'c,r theiT �· bnUovd tMt once tho ceue
tire w: tieon ahown to· ·1t . pnuiiie they "°uld h
no d1ft1 0\lll7
111 l.1aia� nth ·the A1f!l1lf , 'bT p0,1nU.cg o:u\ pHei'ble dmaer
■pot. . ,�.,. add that altlac:n>p they couU ontorce a ceue
fiN cii the p.art ot tl:ro-b · officers and olunteeTS they were
•wrtecl about the Ao tivi i ot tee
aa4 school children.
�J' a.clllitted tbat 'Yiol ce apinat th Any t'requetttl7
.tarted.. "1 •� throwing by ahildren a:n<l that the opport\mitJ'
vu thoa take1s to· ncala:to tb.e violenoo to shootinf; th�7
off� to ,,u .· :it a list . ot places whfft! they · thought . tllo ruk
n.a greatest .,na anted . if tho A.ra, oe>uld avoid. tb.e» a.,,
vb� Qbildren tended to ecmgropta . . Vo ropl1'id .that ar.r,
•P•<tifio propoeal p;ienuinel;J designed to help Would bo "1'8:tullY
ecmaid.•� tm.t that there could be no uncler·taldna that tlto J:t.,rq
W'OUl.4 aiapl:, n-014 beiJIB 1-· uep,· l:LB ted by ·too IRA .

ae�n

·'°
Yi�•

-th4'.t

o

·�

lS . Ve mxt pointed, out tho danger 01" my pre-aet boob., trap, .
A CUN· tire vould
· completely wr&cked. if it were 'follove4
b7 a booby trap killing Brituh olcl1on; it vould 'be. no
adeq,11ate 4etace to aa,· that it
been. is, t beton the ce.ue
t,iff. . Th-,. toolf 11ot.e ot thll i,oint appearing to recopiae ita
toroe · wt · aot knowing• whether o.r not thet h&d any auch tille
bala.

· 1uta

.
;,
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16. Vo tben lhli4 that a nuaber ot _._. ,� ' tbolr orpn.i aauo.n
ware nl1 � DQ• cnlY . 'b7 na.M wt 1r, · aitbt• anti. that tho
.
prospect• of tb• c.eue 1"1re l eading to 'Pft'Mll•t po.• cloponde4
vny JArgaly on theae people lying . lows w p,:e· one or two
ex,m;los and they ropliod that it peoJlo . of tbia· lc:ili4 vere to
.
strut about in. Protutan.\ areas this woul.4 lie an aot ot
provccaUon
17. �
Jacl now lut!ll•d. 2½ houra om Kr <>· Connell ...,
Kr .wa.. · t!:ie abd it' the,' · could. have a •hort period .,n tbtlll'
OIIII. Wha ft ro3oi11414 them· th.,- --.t o,er the pou.nd and
:
cont'il!'DIGd
ba•la on . vhich tb• diaCWJaion hat token ·pl4ee,
�ly that ve flN onl7 authorised. -0:opt vbon reterrinc to ..
11M0 1 8 ptablic#lly eu.'tM poe1tion. to ®•l v.l-th the thne
quoatiom, vbieh had b&en p\1t in. · adftDOe. to the S"retaq of
StAt• . They ao14 Uult bl4Vi.Jig aet: u thQJ" wore JHll'1IOJ1&ll1'
utie.t'ied that nere n •14 ve
authorised to .�
•xp�uly OD behalt of tbo Secre� ctf S•te VG weft 80
autboru· e <t.: but other aeabera o:t theil." orpniutioa bo.4. aft:
•t us u4 ..,. 8'J.4 ·tba t 1a the 'Whole context of Iruh
hisior, 'tbej �• _'boun4 to f.,
.
- . that tbo7 miaht be being
tdcte<t. Voul.4· ,U :qt poaaibl• tor the Sec:retn:, ot state
to set out 1n:-.i-1tiDg hi.a ro�oue tQ the �roe queat1ou
wbich bad btea put? Ve replied thai r� the Secreta:r.r of'
State to aend ·them. &: letter of thia kin4 'IIOuld be politically
who�ly 1-posaibl(IJ U vould hnv• 110 COD tl"Ol over tbo lette
or \;ho •• Jlalle of' .it . . 'fho7 uv tho TAlidity of �ie and 1'
_. rnmtuaU, pi'o� . tbat ttr McCrory who had _.. pre1e.nt
when we first -.t sh-14 bo invited . to call at a eon••nien't
pl� amt aet :a .,r.r!ttea tU,atemnt aigned by tbe Secretary of
Si:at• co,ering �• 'th:No points , When · tbe ·tlrroe p01nta wre
cm� �in n.�rised the ntwence to the poUUcal pri•Ollff•
had � dropped a.nd • nev ono 1ntro4\lCM - l\atJtf:1¥ ••
"' liaison would. be M tabliahtid. initially botw•on a ••r ot
thn Seoretar.y ot .State• • aWt, and a repncentdive ot tho
IRA . dttl tlus object or ruldJJB' the CMo• tire work- . As this
vu .mi· at'ro.npawnt which tho Socretary of St.ate had inatna.cted
wa to obtain if poaeiblo
ll(ldo , no comaent on tJae tact that
it had · aow 1,.,_. a con41,Uon lJt 'the IRA to a oeu• fire . We
.
utd . tbat •• COllH ·not oaimD:lt, tb• s.,.U-17 of ' State to We
propma.l t� ' ·vso Kr llcCroiy but that • vaul.4 .� iately
OOlWGJ' it. iq b.1111.

••�z:w
't"-

war•

wo

:,�

18.. Vs tba bro.ached tm, <lwtation flt: the tbail't6 ct 11 cease
tin. '�r �• Connell surgeatecl the veokend.. Ve empbasined
1
•troz.slt tl,lii UJtPN ot tiolq� Mr 0 Co:nnell roplied that bl
en4 lb.- .... '"r-o not pesent•'ee• and would h&Y• ,\o refer bad(
end tat ...,. W\lld n.ead som tu. to give . � val'.'111n«
clova t:h• l!.u . lf• lfft'e .:aot able at this atap
get thttD to
a,,:ee to at,ance the t:111,e 'bofa..� Fridq.

·'° .
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-'19. l'iaallf, we aaked in mat terms the: cease ti:re ftlll.4· le
mmomacecl btbg pAt"ticularq anxi ous tb:a.t. it should not . ...
'by inadvertanco , diacloa m7 ct the mttera whidi we -'
beGQ diecutw.d.1t4 . . !h�:y appuaftd ope to . ad.tee on tbia pot.at
ucl 1 therefore d1ctate4 the fol101f'ing t�. ldd.ch kt1l
ot tb.ul took_ do• and aa14 would be atJ.etact�:
•ve are � -.n tndctiDi'te oeue fire to �
etf'eot !roa • • • • • • • u in the contideat belief that
the Secretary of State will -- • ncaptional
ne)Omle to this nceptional meaave _. ho ha$ aal4
he vlll do in hia public ota. t.Aellt&. tt
a>. As ve vero about to le-.w.: I uked. Ill" O' Connell llba't the
aise ad ccapoaitiOD ot the UA cleleption t.o moot tbo S .or S
llight be. .Ho 1'riatled a little and. uict they could not accept
an, dictetioo on thia point. I ui,.S. th4t the Secretary ot ,
State na :go.t.ng a long vay 1D a&rOM.11« to �t thoa, th4t U
the:, wanto4 their nev
to b& • wcceaa tbq ahoulcl hn:n
reprd. to hi.a poaiticm
and
that it •�• be better no� to
b
includ peoplo vo W'ft'e well bov:a �•om and facea J lit
particulu it vould -.m it :11\leh &di . r tt Mr McStiotata
were not incl\lded.. � O 'C.onnell � • said -that ho could not
entn into an �Iii . to exclurJo him but added that be
. ia a tol'f,O of YOice vhiah suggested
aipl or fli�t not •�
.
tb&t th.ffo .a ccna14ral/la doubt; vbethar be vo.411 •· v:Uls.z.«
to COll9 �.

•ewe

�1., !he ••ting bad l#IJted ,¼. hours . Aa � WU the ·fuel
eae:ounter v�tb ·fibe Provi:Jipnal. IRA and aa .tll• IDoetiQ« to•. plaOI
in an inlomal- en4 relu•d A'
phere
ot intoffitt ' to
i'eoOl'4 an la�-on. ot �- b'o HlJre8ontaUves vbo came.

it -, �

w

1-:

Rr Aclal
nent,--thr<.u, .
22 • . • Mr o •connen 1• a'biotlt. ��
l':be:M ·iii no 4out.t lhatwn- tliat -these ttto at :lean pnfUinol.y
vanl. a oeaae fire· _ and • permanent ed. .to Tiolea.oe • . VMtnor
pre� · u lo:nh� Irolincl ban brot.tgb.t thea to �• fral!Mt
of •tM thoro ia aleo little ·aoo.'IR thtl1: nillllthat .tfle proapaot
or peooti 1a tbore the7 .ba't'ft a •boac pn,saa&l in04mUff to
try u4 sat tt . The, let �- ejvva1 . ftlllllb •� 'that
tho 111"• ot' tbe Prori•1cmal DO. -.n"011 tile 1"W1 la ·nc a pleall,mt
one .
2'. Their ai,pear..,., • mo.mer w&ltrespoctablo .and reape-ciM �
thq ooeily N·fctrn4 k Hr Whitelaw aa " the . Socfftar,1 (#· State•
aad t.hey addre1J5ed -., tro:m tim.G to Um 44 11tSi.r" . the:, aad no
bolllbastic d;tonco of �bei� peat and nuto · no o.tt.ttcbl on tho
!ritiah Govonment , the Britiah Anq Ol" any · othcr coamiit1os
boclin in UortbeZ1l.· Ir-ela11.d :t Their re• ona·e to every
· · ..-.r&WIID•
� w thoa waa reea0fl4.l>lc enapod«rato.. ffieir
behari.our
·· u4
·
atutwle app� t:0 b
110 relation to the indiscrud.aate
cupa'!,pa of baal>hig: and ohoo-ting · in which tbay ba«botb. 'boell
pz,O!ll1aent �a.den.

'°' .
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H> UUa

, ,

26th July • 1972

,

F'W'. the-.r to my le:t1:er ,��,� -tod.Ay encloS;ing a �opy . �
on Army Qper&ti� 'in : �r thetn lreland , 1 am .,.
sendi�g you ,a dopy .tl� t• •'ctrUt ·.-nc1ments. to the Rules �,:
Engilgement .whi<:h tile
agr.-,ed, i nfo,rmal ly with the Attorn@y
Gelleral on their return
journey
,£rom Nor,thern Ireland l.a st,
,
�-

a.;.s�, �per

<:GS

•�ing .

Tlte . Del�nee Seci:·e t.ar y J• cQntent with . the11e i..-�i s • . on
�t,tic-U•a;r
2,,,., hit <:onddeu that ·the amendme nt 1a ac:c:eptable ,
ctrcwasta�ces of t�o operati9n in q_uegt ion I and &:\l�j�t -to the
conc:U,tiOl:1$ And SAfEtgPXds embodi.ed wi thin it ,. Bu't he wou11 be
gi::a.Je�ial. 11' hct' could have the Pd.-e Minister •·• A9r9e111e�t. , -.nd also
th�,t ot the sec.ret11ry ot &,tat� :fQ� Nor thern irel� Md 1:be
A't l.o�, G_,n,u·•l, i:o . �� �•o new dr aft . R4l es du):1tl9 the ,,oe>�l'se �
tomorrow .-et.nee tJ,ay -,U l �d t,o .1:>e. incorporat ed J.n th•t ,qpttr•t•orwu
Orders �. , (Jrox conven ience a pli(>tocopy: of the exi'S ting Yel,low ·. card
enclosed . )

in �!t�

:t.•

� . am sending copies of this le-U�r to rerty Matt and Tony
ffe,�het ug1:�n .

¢

w Roberts
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DRAFT ltyLES or- . t:NGNJEMENT

Soldiers mo.y fire wtd,out wn ming if tbe re. is no ot,Her _;\Qy· to
t.
protect them��1v,s or t.hose whom t t. _ is . the_lJ\ 4�ty to prot.:ect. . r·r�
11\ia· •p·p1ementa
the danger ot being l<i Hed or eer.l.oualy it\J.,_t�4.
· ·. ·
·
1 2 or the Yellow Card_
For this .ope.ra-t..i on only. o C<NllPtmY ·commander.· may order the
2.
firing or h•a\ty ��s,pija ( such as Carl Gu��ay) egain�t posi tions ··. fro,n
which the� is su•t•i�ed hostUe tir�t' .f,.t J:te. be.Ucvea· th�� this is
neee.se,ary for the pre servo t ion or tb• l.tvcui of soldiers or or other
In d�cidlna whether or not
]M!racms Wh• it 1 s bi s du t.)' (to . protec·t..
to, u,se heayY weapons tull' account . must be taken . or the r1sk that
�he _openlns or ti re. ma_v ��dancer the l ives of innocent, persons.
*.

•.
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APPJffiDIX :Cr Jri.t· ��»
REDRAWING THE BORDER AJQ). POPULA'.r;(ON TRANSFER

ye•

w .. �,(�. - �: .t:J, � � 2. � k ��•i(.#4
-A: H\WH wb1eb h! s oa4r
19tUilll A.:tudsf.c.ul -.....
.JHa:to»e o!4:tbe mU 1-t.Ary apro1l4:ea

_.ea••- tMte aoRl&Hnee ,

.'. · ,. :te4: itb
·· '· · - ��
�u,� -�•b11 · 1n't. Bi ott�·n
. ·�""«P6 ·. ;-''!"'�� . . 9,, . ,. . ,, ,_;;;· . ..i

r! :I
. ,,

D

:::::�::i:e=���-=� ::t1��; .

en& ·: -� . feel' only-�-

emotio-1 _'at�·�tf,'.pn )t'�

tile

Republican, �eu. :1roi accurate and' rece�t' poll.a are
ave:ileble·; - a 1968 .poil eugpaW
in tbrta tawured
· a uni
- tea
·, '

...,�. �n· pointed. to

,

·-�-8:

i�f!��iif- �( -Qi'tbtl/ti

:irjlaffil�,��:.�, a:.,��>i,, nall
:':.:·-� /·: �;:
. i: _

_-

-;_-:

/·.: . · r.,/,. ,: - iff.>.::-

:'.'.

simiJ.@·J �at� !;.

.1.n -:�- •�••�• ot Qy better �. -�

�Jl:�,,.���•,

· _ • , grapbs
;thtt'
asaµme, - th·;Jt�•
tbe C$.tb0lie . ,-����f2
··
v, •· . · 1'o,-.1qwt•
, •· • v·
., �
··
".
i,li'y . · ."""•",, .._.::.:> ··· j

are . ;t�f}i¥trM�•4 .from Northern . Iral�.

,

o:r pdpw..at1on ei,)\ld �-a, actJieyed tiy
.

(af

Thia ��ster
.

.

-

.. ,

.

··

�(e�ing W · tbe Jlep�b11,q Q£ Ir. l�d :(or ¢�9�!�t

{1ldJ: l'Qme
, .. ).F q0:;

ae�r-,,te· status :·within t.h� Unit�.d �u.g40,m)
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consideration wou1d;':be given -�/t�"«� off ••• a�aa
t
l .t

�:0�111;;:•t ,'t.11, �st

- .,- , -�1•: �!�e

�� · :

oensua-.

(1'<> ':d�<?�>• · ttr�� :p1e�:t•��'t-•· �o� :� �o�e-,:�t �bta�

-th. ����J'. '!'�� <Ul.; $�, --�a , -��4 -� -t.o·· µlV��� -�� y �� -

�ij'.
� ·au����� -�ci�

. ��-..} -� - �Mf' �,�- . 1n#J.ml• :� ,�P /. }( #J.it:
abM,tt'.� ared.

ttdlltn,tst�a.���•- · cm�s "(�- .��-�ts,�

� v6uii: be: t�.- ;
� have .- . '. ·bor
·o.)

Jh�'x M,,

cl

�roQhs

�,f _ooui1:,, b�·:)r.

on>this prf.flcl�

Sueh-- -. · �Ji.I

.0:t .flaws :

Il w�ul.4 cr«lte encl.aves ct Republ-Jtaa tettitory

itblb.,·· �em ,lreland and N�rtbern enc1aves. '-ih

the �P'll:>:lic·.
-{11)

It

oulA tr.uat♦r ne -�y -� many 4?r�stan�> ai,

,\�rit� __ . :_ :� ;at-r•r

<l•thol�cia _

c�ut �,. wo@�

(284.;0QO·J wbc>

tJffl,y /�
,(l·,. )

Uv♦:f� ·1".0�� -....U1):le>. 1tyx,· �� . .

•�<ft• ijl

0

-tJili�tJt

: .. ,

· · ,· •r.

i . .·•• ,

·, .

9me t&i>e,e;

.

-both

.,

· · .: ..tii£or,.·
. . ';.· • - . ·

;

or becau •· catholic.

yow,g ._peopl

eo emioi ·:te

: ·.., ,- " - votulg age ) •

� Point J.t;J. could � . ..et ·by J$Do � the �•jp_�J;
- · t w� tllla · wutd ·l9¢.entw1t� . .:tn1r f�j;) :f,'. · (/��,;}

- �t•• is

ah

•· .1;y_- · -·, �- •-

.,-_ �P..:.� ilt' �Po ·

:� for. -�t ...-_ ,_. ::.:,: /_o ;6i{ �·x�d ;t;;f
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tll. _.ti <•nt.- · • · �leot��i1:

(Tl;le,y ay be Union!a'tr!�'be,caw,t aome

imn:Ut•a oo�it-· .

;��

a9r1ty.

I.

· ta�l.toa \'C�e �tf·
-�- ,o�

-�•).tQ. ,jj�i�g·1 _

t

(tr->fil>J.�

-· �o, .•· Thu.-

·
· t': · · ·: .. .
·
··
.(,
�;
'' . . �
to' tiwaat•r

wout,

w

\p:. ·.
/;

,.'�

. . "-"'

·•*� ea•uct. �rt.-�••·an�if� ->t��j
£v -�,- •
�f tlle

·Jll�r.
•t ·

,;c ·. .' ••
• . ' ·.
ci
•
',
· Ddo·
' ; ,50( ;. , · • . . •
" it2•
1um·' ' . ·. .• IJU·
·· ,
::< - :,;J:;:'
<
·"' .
·
.
.
intot'.the- ·ReP\lblicJ ict/·•..fJ: �•· to: ·�:r•r ca�1�.e
·· · ·
. ..
·
.. .

•, Jf�Fan<l :.re�• . rruch

'oi · '--toaW./ c�ty · Lc>Jdonderq

..u di-21 :·�GJ\·, 118:,ooo Proks.tatJW'i�
v-.�i Point HU } .t'a; .:iaoi: una.votda'5le ;
,♦ :· ' .

.:. �·

..

Catho,11cs in Di.fast
c�d

,the · 114.0®

ton « - fd�iy ctoh• ive\ eJ)hlave) . but · it

not!t,� linked. to

other - Catho11c:·, areas

cc;.naiderab.le b�t ••••

•� ,�� ·of �Jc;tt•.

·:�

192,0QQ

Without '.inc-1lld�g ·

thu.ted Xlnetom would:

but q��te ,apart
�t0.-:�l>Y.t•
· , ' > '·,:, _;.�
, -, - ·. 11;1Q� c!Wicul�•1:.i-:l·,,.
-::
, · ;;,:· ·

.

•.-¥

•

'

•

•
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in.•••--· �,

:-�i•�. • d�t ��:
i.trorist orgau14ations.
:t.
The1t• · -•• -��,::�tili :�,:ilftk-4 h dlat �. ,���i�•io•.�.
r♦port .l,y . ���- on flle l•8"- ••iwcr. of, P')-,tbt•

.•,·. • ·• ·•
. ��t. 1B
·
l'iJiwVJl'tJ•i.••• · YOll may think it c���i�Ttc>.. �k(t

terroriam ia an. indispensable, tn.eedieat of any

the ,r��•

!f,��J;i jf:lf•t (•��:•�• •..ject ma�r t• lf

OEN
1e11• �ly. � tatse

; �---;�

��te Fac:tical .pNJb.

twO' lft�nlOR� about •·out"· policy toward• U\1'l'ori,t �pld.111•ttcn,a.
Th• Future .of NortJaer• · kslpd
3.

of the

��e�

.tn OEN 79(72) l 8r th� S"retary ot State .-.:aea that, in view

�,,1,�

�f any c�nHDBUII among the Ule ter ��hate
.
and tb• c=�Jtl.,ty tut th♦y wc;,QJ.d unite to oppoH any aolutl� .�-� :••
.
put ��i.,1:, •.•·• We •� l•t ·· tb.-m b&v;o their •ay at Qt�!��,:��:;�:>

�,-;,r �•�<�

25tb•21� s.-:pte�r hd e.howd then p�oduce a Gr<teo.
.
for g�n,r1-l):0MidJ�•��n. the ideas which we COIUlider tt&ht. ti-•jaa

p��@/,;J��� pre a�t.fi.U.onally. with point• •m•,��I f�e�)�e c�,��••
4.
'the $ecreta� of Stai.· also r4vert• to
.
t.be 8c:t�er but �its that, in terms o! legt•br.'.. F��� i,.. ,mMi·�

l'troJ,�"y���,•��t:°;
,r•

•94:o� :�c,e to hi• p:ropo•ed t♦atalation to 6ii�e.h .��';!����

5.
FimilJy, he indicates in Ann♦¥ 1 the •· tnain el�ji,• diI•
eooe�t��:l ����9mt . which he t\DVi•agi1t,,at the �<oi: ����>��• •

.t .. •· �,.,p..,..1:,.,11olition of sto�mo.nt• .co.up1ed ,.-ith

.1,-,i�ri-:: �ift••�@�� in th� \Ve•tm.i¥�r Patllam:4!nt, • · 1 tre1i0Al

,a••�l� in Beli·� ;aad tb♦ �-1•1: of the laiw �4 Ol"4,o� functi. to Ule
U'nlt«A:�j)gdom, (l��·nm•ijt.
these ••t1Q••tl#1JJ�
6.

He p.-omiae■ further m�rnoranda. •J.attoratbfl

All of th!.• seerna ••olble,_ particwar1y if,

l'i•tl:;� �Jt )•;�,. ,; : e

P�per were U� wtth the implication in p&l;li.1..

112

·
••••:.: ,: · · ·

-

E.R.

SECRET

��•%' �

po•���ih
jiv,e
frtodty \o'I�• •�•ttt 1e,i•�fo�;�t;C�*,'4 • bi• o�r m���

l.ep•bl.tiqn o� th� pl•��ctt� �t .-ha,,e �, 1>�

Publi� o�OJJ wotalct pro��f encl9d• �• •���,�•ctt o,f ri1atlve

pi'lorltl...; and a ·defennent of th• ptflbl•ctte:.:llJ:rtU •a.ft o:r> •• :,u.bllc&fioa
of , .GJ-o,on Paper. would ,:o;a� ,_..y: �rd• r�� lb.et dele'ct in.
th-. $-=r:•��y of-a.tat-•• •r� p�om� .
·
_p1e1,� �-;l'f.,�d,b• '•�--�,• wbe�e..

.•
I

io �•,�•• (0

t;.;:•- �t/ntet• la ttae

#:.;:1J�r-:�J1�. �t,�#n,e

fJ,•IJl�•n lT-1�':,��� a;nt;'.!"4���� �-�--� •�

�Q1'6'era lrelaml, in r:00:9t.l�l tu.me',

,a.•rf,•t•,;� �t.4 •

.
accept' �l' to r�ee:t..
·
·
·
.
.
.
. · . .· · ·· · · . . ,. ·. · ···• · . . . ·,. • ·• •·· > . •. ·. ·.• ··. i ii . ,.:
"!f
--� ;� ;�,. �"Ji ,..W _,. JM�,pfid .¼p .�•:1'4'...t.
. ��•··

·� :U �t ·at•�• &t lea•t ■o��on ol · tbe way_ la wJJi.ch ot.lr �
�l',!'• m�!!S·

And �re.- the �ect::l'•�ry of State•· .., int,nlioJl• �c

•. � Q�i On �• oae Mad ho Ai• �a�apb 5 �f hi� caveriAS n:�)
.
. •'hold back
. oul' view•· on .,!tfbat;:thi,,•o&.ttoa •m>.uld btf;.fo,: a•
. ;.tlii'.t
wd mut
.
,:· ;f , , :'< . , , . .
t i . . .. . . ',. ·
· .
.
.
n
, lOAt •• poaa�le . Oo.· the>othe r- hand he prQPQH• (pan.,r•#l &-.of
·
�:'J;,.�•.. . eve._
��uu.x/-1) 0tp . 4ra,rr .tu ·a�#� ,,�-:�

,�,f�l'ct

th•

�-:r

�r••

f�-�,,..-�.��•"

1• wat,il•hflei .. -�

:i,�i'.!�"�.�; .ich nHd: t�

be · ·.�!CPl�.-•i; -�"" ·� �:�!'•1J1t', �t!�:t#•,.-If ',�) ·.�. (•),

�le•1' le•d -to tho

dlHction of hl• own thinking..

there£ore wbh to satbfy themaelvu . how tar the

:�,.._.•a, P.retty

T¥ -�t� �Y

s..�,••�y of �, 'd�•
.

.:tn fa�t . la tend to,ao cl,urin1: �e con:!eren<;e :au-1 at,what poUit• .1a: imt1on to
q.;,•

the. plibUc•liOJl ,of

'

¼

Uwt :Cr-,•� Pa.,_r, , 1- �11'!101�• ..,t.,.•::�Jlo...:. ria� ou.r

own ini.tlona puhUc. •
·
8_.
l"h,._ .J,Pi!'U• of ,p,:ac���

•a;�· �� •�

-����--c;�J;•i,9f

��c;il.

the· �TelJl� of. State bttpaelf �:t1 that �; ,���f:'M.et:,,�i� it
e
ma.y take,. S.. ·tn�- one thi,q which:ill' liable to unit :the d--nrl•• divided
par:ti.e• •mi to a.nlte , tbem

i.tl,�•�ft� lo OJt�a�ve,a .

•h.».t-t •91-utfon 111 �• �bl,t�.

•1'• tlk�jy�f�4?�r-•

� ma�um s lraiJ;!:for �e :i��l,� l�t-�•�

Aud . .., moment

•�·• � tho �-t
�:C�tt.«�!)wiJl jiiah · .to

♦

� ; �r•:•, <th•r-'C>J'•! 1he &:t��•�sact,ot • :��:J•�: !'e, �� ty:y o(
·
, :_' � �.tta
·· ·k,. whid< tl,ii
- �IL� •'!•'
.
.
· A:�ex 1.
·
The Sec:�ity Package

&t�_,.tl!,r.)' ¢ State;�••

':,,�

j

<!f bia

The -5'.,r.¢r
. •�Y- �t st.a;�•�;�i-opo!l-18 are •�d•� i:Af.�anpb z
.
.
,:C)f; OEN 79,(?Z);. i ,_ T�iai,M•'
·
�b�
.
,prqp9�\•
.
' �t
.\ ,.
, , . .,,, . .- '
. -�
'
.
. .' · .
,. ·: . : . . . -·

'

_ • ·_- -

. .

.

. -·

. ·.-

', ·

:•

;' .

;_.,: :,_ ·· . .

�Y'
. _<

.

�j..

113

-

E.R.

Sli:OllET
(•)

MinialeH ··W;l.11· ·-Vb AtJ. difficulty in a1:r�ein1 that we ahould
conti••�� eo ,-�
deal ••�

(b)

Thia pro_poi�
cleat::•
(1)

(11).:
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�r�lh��

nQT&nal �ta to

$#v.olvo• ��DI B.ecwatlon H.. A.
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:Morip\•i,� ,an.y per■on wll� :b P'•�l �t • number
.of

����� ot:� •��u1.-.:��:1a� ;,;9i' •fii..,.,:,�

�i��.!JM,ti,

Propon1
be � -b. , cban ea of'..-me'.; (cL a'
. (i}7cowd
·. : · ·
: �•·r;t:;ct · ':tF ;· .;::;;/ . y .·. · · :' • · ·
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••1.r,t•
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un:�m,.J,,...

there •��, Tm�
o_.,w,a,'Jl� �

p�,��-: -��••a.�f �:piiov• :._ iev,ery •inste
<;••• ·• &hat U..e. .�,se.nt,6:11.: m q...ation . eatiafie• tho definition
since eithei :•t th•n

;.

or we are ln the dilemma of stating conc:Uttoa• wbloh have -to i��
aali•Oocl while 4o�lat"iA& ubitHrily that c:ortain 011�•.:tlon,
aatt,t;f�pi.

P:roi,o•al (U)

��y r+�••,: ,,,�� on.us of:��� ii' .�r�t;1 u
f&., «t�t•��;to:;••�••· ·ld:•··•· �oe.oac.e ·.to•�a"of
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on the pro•ocutlon to. e•-lt1h lds �•·

(c)

in tho'.�tl&re-ol'. the ,�,�i

But'�• 1eem• inhe.-ent

In f•v,�� •��• lf1••.·PJ'.opo•�· to �tr�\lC;• •�C)J-.J . .c�.;t.:. ;�� ,�l��,::
(""ick:lf�o;�J,��•ju! in Appendix 1 , � G�N,·79(f;i ) t1),,Jj. ··,# b<t
argued, �t w�f,���'bt.ptl�pl� be

•••def\\�, a �kl

:��1'••• :�n•,b�y \Vbieh at ,��.••-.� •�•r•

p•�c�•• fd�, 'tb♦
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c:o��j,. •*•n••l�, ,a�ai#aJJb: f�t �-;� u,.
(lE'N ,,(r�l lJJ;. '�:.tbe Attome y GuJ��. :.o may: �� -�•
�e
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ew,po.-tM b:f the Lord �ellor. 1a likely to ffllpha.;.• o the
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of.••••ia� judge-• with tho kind ·of court cleecrib.ecf
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b
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a
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�ta••

-n,;t� nc,t �t �!��ry �� d,t!
lt ala()· ��•�..,,;'. ��: Mhitatera jrcJ :•ti:��;

•�•�lnl ,v��
wa,:'-1ttfog?

tha:t the iHue'• are not aw;:-h ... to:ari'aat;a Dill.
The int.-9d.uctlon of lttti•lati<»a· a• toan.•alF�••lblif t<l;,pr.cw.lde for

(b)

the,"'e,�ibme,_._ -�\•�dal �·'- or-.trlb�:.••l to ;:,r�a1
�•<'.<?� :1u,u�♦ (T���itf:t,���),�ct 'fNn4un
1�1aac) _;:it,o
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. . . .���
• . u 1u·o,.�iln.
. . . · .. , . . :·•@,�••J1b'.t:i:Jf
·, .
•
· :r ::

GEN 79('1:Z) 1 9,.

'J:ti ·. In the• tinal ••l\tem:e . of GEN 79(12) �i/\� Sft�ta� '�;��it

: �-ftl,, 111,:,,eoU•�•

h

udt;�•/..

pr�.i,.

to • u,i1e:et vl&ble alterutivea to

·•,Wi , '· , ·

lt i• diffieQl.t to •ria•l•/What tll•h·ticould b.e �

�� -�i!:!::=a;:.;;=:;�-��•
take •Wl �or•: �,� once

·fully �tional.

· the:&ilt!�t��: i�et��;:�:���tB,,tt

lft ,o._r wol'd.a the -�

�bf•ht''U: #r,��J,

to·,_.

lf:�:,:

ri�(;_;,:
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d"tlve muclti 1"fote·,tbe,: ye&1' Of dirttct rule ·:��ee �;�ll;·�..
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'., .
. · . , . . . · : . . _ :- . -·� :: -{ :_ :-· : ·: : :,-./\\·.;,,\.:';_: ·':"' _ ,':•
. - '\'- >:.i.\'./"tf<·;".'.'./ �--- -.:::C .�
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: lda�h• 1 91t,) ,and -.�•-».�•--•-��j;JJ.... cqa1tlt\ltloul: tol�•·&,.•
to -.,�· pot 1,nto eUjo;t '.(�e-■ '!'• a�� :��pued. or ;¢ompe,Uect. io ext.,_d
dired

r:w-. ,� • !lUthu ,peljo(l).

If the

�lill'i'1lt:W♦' $•f�•--- on

thia .pomt. wW they. admit that the t�:r,�:] 'qli•Pl�,...i,���\��;: ·�ll

loocn into ih:o pe�Cof4the ·pe-�anent aeW.ment-?
t

cd�ue (!or how
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lt doe• IIC>t, lt l• hi.J,dJ.y worth the· tr��- of le�•�. ij,: �-1'•.ato, 111.e
:�ij -:
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p,-�t· •�t8-���},e,; � in· •J,ileh
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result 1n Northern lreJand'• becomlil.1 more .rather �J•••:
Unitoo :ktnad.om (-ttb. hac:'iden�, incnat�d . represontatm in th.ii

P.:�J��eat a:�'iW'e•�•ter), we •�;�¼il�t;i';t :•••U.Jilit1;.
_.- ..
:r. · ·•-�· :-. :':. . . " ·-_,,:-:· . ·_ \-1::�;-=: "❖
·_: .. (__ . :, •�,:-=·
�dle ,:Pr°"�•·:a jll.didal •ntein whicl. wo�d �t,.�e •��•·•�;..,.

"1�;���1
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part 1" �e Vni�il Kh?"�i

p,t•e��m in :tlk•·�P�� , · · .
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T·ttl.CflMONC WMJ"rat�4 70:ai

OONFJDB.NT IAL

(JJ�

a9tJ;a Movember ·l.972

Md 19/3A

lk
!)ut· �rr,t..,.

A't . .the -N 7.9 (72 ) 331:d meeting al) U�h. Sept�er the Pdme
Milµ•-i: ·•·d . t�t f'.the qu�sUon o� aeuera . o;f . !IW UDR who were
al•o · a.s,ocl-.ted wi::lb �; Ul?A required :f\l�the� consideration .
•• · �•;tU')" ot S't�t•, (t'9l' - ffortbern Ir.el.and) sbQuld circu1ate
a : nc;>te ' ifllli�•'tlftf wh�'t . he pr<>posed0 ..

*'

'the.

I
I

policy • � torce at t:h•t time was e stabli,;bed in July
197.2 jn·· :the U ght of three maj or :f acto¥'.& .. First . t.hcf U'DA is
an il1e9al. oxganisat'lpn and member ship of it i s not an of:fence
unde.r military law; Second1y . an important £unct ion en tho UDA
�• 10 · channel into a cons tructive and <licSci,l>�ined di rection
ftr��•·t&l,lt energies which might o therwise become dis�uptive .
fl.'titdl.y, a1though an application to join the . UDR wou1d ;'110't be
autmati�lly rejecte<l because . o.r UDA mesnbersh ,ip• . clue weigb'.t
wo\\ld . be, '.g:lveb in tit� \Petting :JJr<>eess to extreme: ;;,X-ot�ejant
,,,.�thi•s •and· a f!�,,n known to be a ••be.r of the..· U:l:>A woul�
be most un.likel,y to �· admit ted .
Against this backgro� , th� ·_ pol�cy ••��,.,� in 4�)'
was that . . an ofL'i.�er sbou1d ha u•'d. to . �••S:p: . u· he . tOQk an
active i-,it in UOA :•tivi Ua . . A: .,liG•, would :�: warned
suspected �f suffic iat - •YDlPa1:hy £or UDA .• .a:ims -to a:ff'ect his
military- ;�ti.es � c;-11 ln ques t ion his loyalty_; _ , U . his
conduct ad.Ung . �:r- JJJ>.\ membership . cons ti tu ted & ail:itaxy
offence or· un•ati.s.tactoi:y, Cf,,lnduc t , he would ,be clism:.ls.sed.

u

this polic)' --,u kept. under review _, bU� onl. y recent ly b&s
i t i,.�n �01u;;£d,rt� pecessary to make changes . Follow ing
discus•� wi'th • GOC, , and consul tation with tbe Seq .r etary
ot St&'t4e -1:or Ncrtt)ern Ireland , the �:fence Secretary bas
dec�ded to app1y th'is policy, more !!S trict1y .. . He mis 'tblt;rete>;re
·a new Regimental. _. ,Routi.G-ca Order· which was 'l ssued 9n
,2"7tJi .No'\$� . I a 1: tach 't$1: ' �J ct' tbi.s' at Annex . X't wa

•PJi'r��

c w RobflJ:'.ta , a,q •.
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•
'aC>l c;<>JW�e� del:iir abl.e c: pr�c ti.cal to make ateiilb••�P,.::;�i
.
o'I the . UDR • . · , ,()�,: ·.··• . . '•,: :.
'the . up�\. :�(bar '. in itsel:! to membership
re.t�•- ht'); •.,����p;
�J:•:•AA�flo� rea&Ol\$ .. . tlu.l Or<leJ"
��1i.c . ti-Se,rvkenien • s A1'·soc.iatiQ1i' w icll MW;�;jtJ:•t :
o� ·

th•:
Republi� sympathies .

�o

Followino this new . Order, off;ws _whose !-9��
sus.1tect..,.will.�be . uke��...._ox:: redgp : soldiet:s will be
di�sed under thEf xegu.lat.ton which allows th.is 'to be done
because "thCt:ix tle;yi�sl AXA . no longex r §quired".• . No apeoj;.ti�
exp1anat ion wlb be give n ; we ecnploy onl y those � .wish to
continue 'to employ and our �c:rt ion ·will be within 'the t�.rms
and· conditions aec:epted on joining -.tbe Qe9.imerit •

�f c·�e

wlU r••ulf �:: ·:•�I
.�f;4o i,,ot �t �t;
-�• ·•·. abollt ,$0 5!i�IJ!&'Sjal•f �- they will ,_ 'cuff�··
.
' . · ��
9ra;du&1w; ever a p.u:�ocl; , tXI.· �u� - ..ks. .
, , :;:Jj � Stitdipv · ·c<Jptes oL -thi, ie·tte:t 'to Antc»ly �l�',
Terry ;Plat't , Graham. M\�l and 'l'o,-,- H9thednvtc:m , - �. ,Q '.:Bd.p
llorb!IJ;y•

-t.- �

( R A OJST-JS )
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MBMURSHIP OF . BXf:B.BM!ST ORGANl: SA't-IONS
�1: ac,:l'�t:laa ,by _..-,era of . sectarian: «'>t�•att:cma
1.
ha.ve _sbJ.nm a 1'4"9d to c1u:t1y tbe po1'.i;cy �· ••�t• of' the
tiwolvod. in such orgmjbati<ms o tbtl 'VDA
UDR
- , �aiid

-.ho- �•

�;

'

'

' ' '

,

,

,

2 . . Tile Ut)R . �• . .� non -$etlta;r ian force , a� any , adiv
.· < •
involvement
&; sectarian o.(9anisa_t ion is bound t <;, eall 1'l�:
que.s tiori a. soldier 1 s •ui tabil ity -f_or cont1 nu-1d, inembersbip' ili ··
t.he Regiment . i.�; a.· soldier • • sympathy for 1 ,�he UDA , QSA <,r:½1
any sim:ilax- organisat ion i s strong nough to: af'::fect the
peit'ormance ol his mil i tar y du ties or 'to call. in ques ti on
··bis , f u ture 1-oyalty or bi complete impartiality I h wi ll
be discharged.

s-�·

3-�
We have tea.ch� the stage . whe re fl'cm Who. �'. l�l',8,1 to
Her ,raj es tv ;� :t make a cl•� d0¢i sion/. . �;they
st� , and ••t: i:ealise that the best •tY . ti.;) oorit.r:ibµ:te t�
the ,ate y 9t th1t . c:�ll-l1:Y 18 to give· tMir undivided support
to the Secu% �� Po�c•••

�bei'�
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